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Chapter 1 
Inequality Limits Liberty 
 
“Our minds tell us, and history confirms, that the great threat to freedom is the 
concentration of power. Government is necessary to preserve our freedom, it is an 
instrument through which we can exercise our freedom; yet by concentrating power in 
political hands, it is also a threat to freedom” – Milton Friedman, 1962: 2. 
 
“For millions of people, wealth amounts to little more than a few weeks’ wages 
in a checking account or low-interest savings account, a car, and a few pieces of 
furniture. The inescapable reality is this: wealth is so concentrated that a large segment 
of society is virtually unaware of its existence, so that some people imagine that it 
belongs to surreal or mysterious entities.” – Thomas Piketty, 2017: 259. 
 
 
After more than 40 years of increasingly liberalized markets, liberal societies turn out 
to be as unequal in the distribution of material wealth as in the 1920s (Piketty, 2017: 23). The 
dream of the perfect allocation of goods by means of free markets has resulted in a reality in 
which wealth becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of a minority of society. David 
Harvey (2005) defends this line of argument and is supported by the evidence Thomas Piketty 
(2017) presents in his recent book Capital in the Twenty-first Century. Piketty’s book 
demonstrates that material inequalities are considerably widening in liberal democracies over 
the course of the last four decades. Remarkably enough, not only inequalities in capital-
ownership increased considerably but also the differences in income from labour grew rapidly 
between the top 10% and the bottom 50% of the populations of liberal democratic societies 
(Piketty, 2017: 226). Harvey states in this regard that “[t]he top 0.1 per cent of income earners 
in the US increased their share of the national income from 2 per cent in 1978 to over 6 per cent 
by 1999, while the ratio of the median compensation of workers to the salaries of CEOs 
increased from just over 30 to 1 in 1970 to nearly 500 to 1 by 2000” (Harvey, 2005: 16).  
In the United States, one of the most unequal liberal countries, the top decile currently owns 
72% of the entire national wealth while the bottom 50% of the population owns only 2% 
(Piketty, 2017: 257). At the same time the share of the top 1% of the US population grew from 
about 28% of the total national wealth in 1970 to 35% in 2010 (Piketty, 2017: 349). This data 
might seem unsurprising with respect to the United States as they are known pioneers of laissez-
faire economics. However, we see the same trend in countries like Germany despite its social 
market economy. In January 2018 the German newspaper, Der Spiegel, revealed that 45 
German citizens own as much as the bottom half of the entire German population (Diekmann, 
2018). 
From this development Harvey concludes that there is an attempt to “restore the power of 
economic elites” (Harvey, 2005:19), and Piketty remarks that it poses a “risk of a drift toward 
oligarchy” (Piketty, 2017: 514). I remain neutral regarding the question of whether or not there 
is an attempt to restore an elitist economic system. However, it has to be acknowledged that it 
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is characteristic for the actual situation of liberal democracies that society is divided into 
extremely unequal economic classes. But why is that worrying? It will become clear in the 
following that the fact that wealth is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small fraction 
of society is undermining the most central value of liberal societies: liberty. It shall become 
clear that the concentration of economic power caused by the emergence of an economic elite 
causes the concentration of political power. This inequality in the distribution of power is, 
however, problematic for a legitimate democracy and thereby for individual liberty. 
I follow Jürgen Habermas in his understanding of legitimate law guiding a society. He 
states that, laws are only legitimate if the addressees of the law equally perceive themselves as 
its authors (Habermas, 1998: 254). To perceive themselves as all authors of the law, every 
individual needs to have an equal status within a community. This is the status of citizenship 
constituted by democratic self-determination. That means that citizens need to have equal 
democratic self-determination, that is equal political autonomy. Habermas states that public-
autonomy is co-original with private autonomy. While public-autonomy is constituted by rights 
of participation, private autonomy is constituted by rights guaranteeing individual liberties 
(King, 2018: 157). Co-originality means that the two concepts of private and public autonomy 
are inextricably connected (Habermas, 1998: 258). From that it follows that a person’s private 
autonomy is limited if her public-autonomy is not guaranteed, and vice versa (Habermas, 1998: 
257). Therefore, individual liberty cannot be guaranteed without public-autonomy, i.e. 
democratic co-determination. In that way, democratic co-determination and individual liberty 
are internally connected in regard to the liberal requirement of legitimate laws governing a 
liberal society.  
I will argue in the following that massive concentrations of wealth are problematic for 
liberal democracies because concentrated material power undermines the democratic process. 
That is problematic regardless of the specific notion of democracy one favours. Whether one is 
a defender of an elitist democratic model,1 or a proponent of radical democratic2 ideas, as an 
advocate of democracy per se one should be concerned if political power is not constituted by 
means of rights, but by means if material wealth.  
In order to clarify this, I will in chapter one first draw on Jeffry Winters’ (2011) definition of 
oligarchic power. This will help to point at the danger that wealth concentration poses for 
liberty. Since political co-determination is necessary for a legitimate democracy, a notion of 
liberty needs to recognize political co-determination in order to be sufficient for a liberal 
democratic society. For that reason I will, secondly, discuss different notions of liberty and their 
ability to recognize the concentration of wealth as a limitation. While I will reject positive and 
negative liberty, the notion of republican liberty will prove most suitable for a liberal 
democracy. Chapter two will be devoted to taking this insight one step further. In view of the 
actual trend of increasing inequalities in liberal democracies, I will introduce Alan Thomas’ 
(2017) proposal for new economic institutions that he claims avoids the concentration of wealth 
and guarantees equal political co-determination. In the third chapter I will examine whether 
Thomas’ proposal succeeds in guaranteeing liberty. In the first part of the last chapter I will 
focus on the internal coherence of Thomas’ theory. The second and final part will be devoted 
                                                      
1 Favouring rule by a democratically elected political elite (cf. Schumpeter, 1942). 
2 Advocating participation and deliberative engagement in politics by citizens (cf. Wright, 2011); Or most 
prominently (cf. Mouffe, 2000). 
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to analysing whether POD is sufficient in its ability to yield the institutional design that 
guarantees individual liberty in light of material inequalities. I will argue that Thomas’ proposal 
is unsuccessful in guaranteeing the kind of liberty in question. The discussion will provide 
valuable insights for future considerations on appropriate economic institutions that aim at 
guaranteeing individual liberty.  
 
 
1. Material and Political Power 
 
Before turning to the discussion on different notions of liberty I first want to clarify the 
relation between material and political power. This will be crucial in understanding the task 
that actual liberal democracies face in safeguarding liberty. I will use Jeffrey Winters’ (2011) 
analysis of oligarchic power. Thereafter I will point out its tension with democracy.  
Two aspects of Winters’ characterization of oligarchic power are important for the 
following: first, oligarchic power emerges if there are extreme material inequalities in society. 
Wealth has thereby to be distributed such that a minority of society possesses significantly more 
than most others who have considerably less wealth. By means of their materially superior 
position, oligarchs enjoy more power than the latter group (Winters, 2011: 4). That is, oligarchs 
maintain their position of power by means of their wealth. 
Since oligarchs have no primary interest in political rule, oligarchic power is characterised 
secondly by the self-interested use of the power (Winters, 2011: 7). That is, oligarchs use their 
power not to achieve a higher political goal but for the advancement of their own power position 
by increasing their wealth. That is why oligarchs take measures to accumulate more wealth as 
well as measures to avoid levies. In order to achieve the latter, oligarchs engage in activities of 
wealth defence (Winters, 2011: 10). They use thereby a fraction of their wealth to safeguard 
their power position to their own advantage. The following exemplify a few possible strategies 
for wealth defence: One of the most prominent and recent forms is through what is known as 
lobbying, i.e. political influence of interest groups, or campaign financing. Interest groups 
influence politicians by means of campaign donations, high positions in executive board 
committees or the like, and thereby wield influence on political decisions, draft bills or profit 
from political attention (or disguise) (Monbiot, 2017). It can equally come in the form of 
foundations or thinktanks representing vested interests of wealthy individuals. Oligarchs also 
sponsor scientific studies in their interests, or allocate experts informing the media and political 
bodies (Monbiot, 2017). While wealth defence can include half-legal or illegal measures – for 
example measures of tax avoidance, which was quite recently attracting attention caused by the 
revelation of the panama papers or of several tax havens – it is not necessarily against the law 
(VanOpdorp, 2017). Wealth defence includes also, for instance, the ability of wealthy 
individuals to hire lawyers and other professionals who vindicate the oligarchs’ vested interests. 
Accordingly, wealth defence can be summarized as the possibility of materially superior 
individuals to purchase professionals who promote their vested interests and safeguard their 
power positions (Winters, 2011: 18-26). 
While all individuals have the possibility to hire professionals to work for them, the difference 
is the extent and the consistency with which materially superior individuals can advance their 
interests (Winters, 2011: 4). Material power enables some individuals to advance their interests 
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not only economically, but politically and extends their individual power from the economic 
sphere to the political sphere. That is, material wealth not only constitutes economic power but 
also political power. With that said, the emergence of oligarchies is problematic for a liberal 
democratic society in the following way: Democratic power and oligarchic power have 
different resources of power. While the power resource of an oligarchy is based on material 
wealth, a democracy is “based on rights, procedures, and levels of popular participation” 
(Winters: 11). Thus, in a democracy political power is constituted by formal rights. However, 
with the emergence of an oligarchy within a liberal democratic society, political power is 
constituted by two different resources of power: formal rights and material wealth. As I showed 
in the examples above, oligarchic power has not only the potential to influence the political 
process, but also to undermine political power constituted by formal rights. By that I refer to 
cases of tax evasion, that is bypassing laws by finding loopholes in legislation. Winters calls 
this the versatility of material power (Winters, 2011: 18). Since there are many different ways 
in which material wealth can be used, power by means of material wealth has the potential to 
transfer to spheres that are constituted by different power resources, like formal rights. Winters 
states accordingly that “large and concentrated sums of wealth in the hands of a small fraction 
of a society’s members represent a power resource that is not only unavailable to the 
propertyless, but significantly more versatile and potent than formal or procedural power 
resources such as equal voting rights – particularly when measured at the individual level. The 
sheer versatility of material power is what makes it so significant politically” (Winters, 2011: 
18). While ordinary individuals are only able to advance their interests politically by voting, 
comparatively wealthy individuals have the ability to pay others who influence the political 
process in indirect but effective ways as I have detailed above. The many different ways in 
which material power can be used to influence politics are thereby only accessible to those 
individuals that are in possession of the material means. 
What was just said suggests the concern that concentrated wealth limits democratic 
equality and thereby liberty. That is because the advancement of the oligarchy’s vested interests 
has implications for the rest of society. The interference of oligarchic power with political 
decisions limits the power of the demos. If the demos is not the only existing source of power 
that determines a society’s political direction, it follows that the addressees of the law are not 
its authors. Unequal political power is further a limitation of liberty. That is because political 
decisions within a democratic polity are equally binding for all. However, due to their material 
superiority, some individuals have the means to impact political decisions more meaningfully 
than others. “Gross inequalities in wealth generate massive inequalities in political power and 
influence within democracies” (Winters, 2011: 5). The wealthy minority thereby enjoys not 
only an advantage in advancing their individual interests privately – due to their material wealth 
– but also politically. In contrast, individuals who lack the material means cannot advance their 
personal interests with equal political power. They further face the threat of being politically 
disadvantaged by decisions that favour the vested interests of a wealthy minority (Winters, 
2011: 10). Wealthy individuals thereby enjoy the power to influence the lives of all other 
members of society.  
As we shall see in the next section, the limitation on equal political power coincides with 
the limitation of liberty. I will discuss different notions of liberty in regard to their ability to 
recognize political co-determination. I argued above that political co-determination is 
inevitable for a liberal society. In order to clarify the kind of notion of liberty here in question, 
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I will first reject Isaiah Berlin’s two notions of liberty – positive and negative – and turn then 
to Philipp Pettit’s republican understanding of liberty. The following discussion will highlight 
the urgency to safeguard liberty in the face of the massive concentration of wealth in liberal 
societies. 
 
 
2. Liberty for a Democratic Society 
 
In this chapter I will consider two prominent concepts of liberty by drawing on Isaiah 
Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty (Berlin, 1969). After I have rejected them as inadequate for a 
democratic society I will turn to Philip Pettit’s republican notion of freedom, which will prove 
to be adequate for recognizing equal political co-determination as inevitable for individual 
liberty. The following discussion will be framed with an eye on material power considering that 
it poses a considerable limitation on democratic equality as was shown in the previous section.  
 
 
§1 Negative Liberty 
 
Berlin defines negative liberty as the absence of interference (Berlin, 1969: 16). 
Individual people or a group of individuals is free if no other agent interferes in what individuals 
or groups of individuals would be able to do without the interference. Berlin contrasts 
interference by others with the “mere incapacity to attain a goal” (Berlin, 1969: 16). If 
individuals cannot attain their goals because they do not have the capacity to do so, it is not a 
limitation of freedom. It only is a limitation of freedom if another agent is causing that 
individuals cannot act as they would have if there were no interference. Therefore, the area in 
which individuals should not be interfered with is the ‘naturally’ given range within which they 
can pursue their goals. 
However, the negative notion cannot account for equal political liberty as would be 
necessary for democracy. According to this notion all individuals are equally free regardless of 
their initial material and social situation, if they are guaranteed non-interference. This leads to 
an absurd situation in the following way:  The assumption that a person is free if she is free 
from interference by others implies that a person who is starving without interference is still 
considered to enjoy maximum liberty. Berlin states in this regard: “The Egyptian peasant needs 
cloths or medicine before, and more than, personal liberty, but the minimum freedom that he 
needs today, and the greater degree of freedom that he may need tomorrow, is not some species 
of freedom peculiar to him, but identical with that of professors, artists, and millionaires.” 
(Berlin, 1969: 18) In other words, the peasant is only able to care about his freedom or 
interference if certain conditions are satisfied. That is satisfaction of certain conditions enables 
the peasant to be in a position that allows him to care about freedom. Accordingly, mere non-
interference is not sufficient to enable individuals to be in that position in the first place. 
“Without adequate conditions for the use of freedom, what is the value of freedom?” (Berlin, 
1969: 17) However, if something else is needed so that liberty becomes valuable for individuals, 
it follows that either liberty is not primarily important to individuals or that non-interference is 
not sufficient for liberty. Non-interference is only important for individuals who are already in 
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a position to care about freedom. This contradicts that freedom, as John Rawls states, is a 
primary good that people have fundamental interest in obtaining for themselves, regardless of 
what else they want (Rawls, 2001: 58-59). Non-interference appears to be insufficient to 
satisfy our intuitions about freedom. If freedom is the most pivotal value it cannot be defined 
as something that only privileged individuals have interest in obtaining. 
However, even if we suppose that all individuals in a society have sufficient subsistence 
to care about interference, another problem arises. Negative liberty does not require popular 
control or political engagement of any kind in order to be guaranteed (Berlin, 1969: 22). 
Accordingly, it is possible that negative freedom is guaranteed under a benevolent despotic 
government. A benevolent despot who would guarantee social stability and thereby ensure non-
interference to all individuals would meet the requirement of negative liberty. It is even 
conceivable that individuals under a despotic system would have some formal political rights 
like freedom of assembly and freedom of speech; however, they would have no influence on 
political decisions. This is problematic since political rights of expression and assembly are in 
place in order to give individuals the power to impact politics. According to the negative view, 
individuals are free even though they have no power over the laws that influence the political 
direction of their society, as long as these laws ensure that individuals are privately free from 
interference. Therefore, the negative notion is insufficient for a democratic society because it 
would readily accept the rule of a benevolent despot as freedom-enabling. That implies that 
negative liberty would consider politically dominated individuals as free. Individuals under a 
benevolent despotic regime that guarantees non-interference would still live on the whim of the 
despot, hoping that he will not interfere with them. However, the ‘lucky circumstance’ of a 
slave whose master treats him with respect does not make the slave a free man. The same applies 
to legitimate rule. We would not consider a government legitimate just because it coincidentally 
gives us freedom. Under the rule of a benevolent despot citizens would have to accept 
heteronomous laws which would limit their public-autonomy. Public-autonomy is however co-
original with private-autonomy, which means that if one is limited the other one is as well. 
Since the members of a society are subject to the laws of the despot and are not the authors of 
the law that determine their lives, they cannot be considered free. Law is only legitimate if 
individuals are in control of the political framework that preserves their freedom. The negative 
notion does not recognize the necessity of political co-determination against arbitrary power as 
an important requirement for freedom. The negative notion would even justify a dominating 
despotic government as liberty-enabling. Despotism would not be acceptable from a liberal 
perspective as legitimate rule. Therefore, the negative notion is not sufficient to guarantee 
liberty for a liberal democratic society.  
If negative liberty is open to the benevolent despot example, oligarchic power structures 
seem to be supported, or at least not recognized as problematic for co-determination. It is crucial 
that economic institutions are informed and structured in ways that support an understanding 
of liberty that bolsters the aims of a liberal democratic society. The negative notion is 
insufficient in guaranteeing political co-determination. In the next section I will consider a 
notion that allows for co-determination.   
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§2 Positive Liberty 
 
In contrast to the previous notion of liberty that was concerned with the area within 
which individuals should be free, positive liberty is concerned with the source of control. Berlin 
defines positive freedom as self-mastery. “[It] derives from the wish on the part of the individual 
to be his own master” (Berlin, 1969: 22). Individuals are thereby free if they are the source of 
control. This notion implies a free will that individuals must use in order to be their own source 
of control (Berlin, 1969: 23). Individuals are only free if they are able to follow their true 
interests. This requires on the one hand, that individuals have the material means to realize their 
true higher goals but on the other hand, that they are aware of what they ought to want. For 
individuals to be able to follow their true rational and moral goals, their interests must be free 
of “irrational impulses and uncontrolled desires” (Berlin, 1969: 23). Individual people are 
therefore free if they are the rational, self-directed master of themselves.  
Assuming that all individuals are autonomous self-determined beings who are masters 
of themselves, popular control over political rule necessarily follows. Popular control is an 
extension of individuals who are true masters of themselves to the public sphere. That implies 
that individuals could not be considered their own sources of control if they are subject to 
heteronomous political control. Therefore, the positive notion recognizes political co-
determination as necessary for self-directed individuals to be free.  
While this notion recognizes popular control as necessary for legitimate rule if all 
individuals are self-determined, it is subject to what Berlin calls the paradox of positive liberty 
(Berlin, 1969: 24): Political co-determination just follows if we assume that all individuals are 
autonomous beings. However, it is all too likely to assume that not all individuals are able to 
follow their rational and moral higher goal. An oligarchy could now claim that its existence is 
constitutive of the realization of self-mastery for all members of a society. For instance, the 
oligarchy could claim that their material superiority is beneficial for society’s economic 
situation. They could claim that without their material superiority every individual in a society 
would lack the basic material means that are necessary for individuals to reach their higher 
goals. Accordingly, it would follow that oligarchic power is not freedom-limiting. According 
to Berlin, freedom understood as being able to follow one’s true interests poses a threat for 
individuals to be coerced by someone who claims to know what those true interests should be 
directed on (Berlin, 1969: 24). That is, coercive and paternalistic actions are justified for the 
reason to enable a person’s liberty. Thus, the positive notion results in a paradox.  
Positive liberty demands individuals to follow their higher moral goals or their true 
interests. While this can imply political co-determination, it can equally result in political 
coercion. Positive liberty is open to the paradox to coerce individuals to be free which is why 
we should reject this notion. In the next section I will consider a notion of liberty that is able to 
meet the demands of a liberal democratic society.  
 
 
§3 Republican Liberty 
 
Both negative and positive liberty would allow for situations in which individuals in a society 
have no say about the laws under which they live. As a result, a combination of the two notions 
would suffer the problems of both. That is because neither can guarantee, as Habermas 
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demands, that the addressees of the laws are equally its authors (Habermas, 1998: 254). In the 
first section I argued that democratic self-rule is essential for individuals to understand 
themselves as the authors of the laws under which they live, which in turn is necessary for them 
to enjoy individual freedom. This way of thinking is supported by Philip Pettit (1997) who 
intends to overcome the limitations of the previous two notions of liberty by advocating 
republican liberty. According to the republican view, freedom is a status that comes with 
citizenship, which enables a person to enjoy certain rights and privileges as guaranteed by a 
legal framework that ensures that citizens are free from domination (Pettit, 1997: 36-41). 
Republicans perceive freedom as non-domination that is defined as absence from arbitrary 
interference (Pettit, 1997: 271). Republican liberty is characterized by the following two 
features:  
First, republican liberty recognizes the arbitrariness of interference as liberty-limiting 
(Pettit, 1997: 22-6). That is, republicans do not recognize all kinds of interference as limitations 
of liberty, only those which are arbitrary. Interference is arbitrary if it is controlled by the will 
or judgement of the interferer without reference to the will or judgement of the person interfered 
with. Interference is non-arbitrary if it conforms to an agent’s real interests (Pettit, 1997: 272). 
Pettit’s understanding of real interests should not be conflated with the evaluative conception 
of interests as advocated by positive liberty. The evaluative notion would assume that 
individuals have true interests directed at a higher rational or moral goal and would be held 
hostage to the paradox as stated in the previous section. On the contrary, republican liberty 
identifies only a person’s real interests – the actual interests a person expresses – as relevant. If 
a person experiences interference that tracks her real interests the person is in control of the 
interference (Harbour, 2012: 189). That is, a person had to decide between the attractive options 
A or B and the person chose B. If the person were interfered within B, then the person were in 
control over the interference, because B is her real interest. From that it follows that the laws 
governing a society must track the interests of the citizens in order to guarantee their freedom. 
In order to ensure that individuals are in control of the interference caused by the laws under 
which they live, appropriate institutions and procedures have to be in place (Pettit, 1997: 271). 
The members of a political order exercise control over the interference caused by the laws by 
means of procedural mechanisms, i.e. the contestatory forum (Harbour, 2012: 196). Since it is 
impossible that the laws track the real interests of every single individual, Pettit states that all 
individuals should equally have the possibility to contest and deliberate on political decisions. 
This, he states, takes place in the contestatory forum that has to be inclusive in order to ensure 
that all citizens have an equal possibility to contest political decisions and deliberate on their 
interests (Pettit, 1997: 187-93). If these procedures are absent, individuals are dominated 
because they are subject to arbitrary interference. Note that, even if interference tracks a 
person’s interests accidentally, the person is still subject to the whim of another if appropriate 
institutions are not in place (Pettit, 1997: 27). That is because the republican considers liberty 
only ensured if an appropriate institutional design guarantees non-domination by liberty-
enabling laws. Therefore, republican liberty is constituted by the status of citizenship, which is 
ensured by laws that track the interests of the members of a society. 
The second characteristic of republican freedom is the capacity-component (Waldron, 
2007: 145). Unlike the negative notion, the republican considers also those individuals as unfree 
who are under the potential threat of being arbitrarily interfered with by others even if the 
interference is not yet taking place (Pettit, 1997: 271). By contrast negative liberty only regards 
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interference that is actually taking place as liberty-limiting. According to the republican view 
the mere capacity to be dominated already limits individual liberty. Recall the example in the 
section on negative liberty. The benevolent despot would be accepted by advocates of negative 
liberty because she causes no actual interference. The republican would recognize the 
benevolent despot as liberty limiting because the laws and institutions are not in place that 
ensure citizens’ rights and liberties independently from the despot’s goodwill. Once again, to 
guarantee liberty the republican demands an institutional design that ensures that all citizens 
have the possibility to be in control of the interference caused by the state and other individuals 
(Pettit 1997: 276). Laws need to track the real interests of the citizens in order to be non-
arbitrary. That is why all individuals should have the possibility to contest political decisions 
and to publicly deliberate (Pettit, 1997: 183-205). Republican liberty thereby explicitly 
recognizes the necessity of political co-determination in the way that the addressees of the law 
should equally be its authors. That is because republican freedom requires an institutional 
design that demands the equal possibility for all individuals to further their interests politically.  
Accordingly, republican liberty identifies oligarchic power as liberty limiting. That is for the 
following two reasons: first, oligarchic power would limit equal citizenship. If some citizens 
have more power to further their interests politically, the laws do not track the interests of all 
citizens equally. Secondly, the political interference caused by materially superior individuals 
is arbitrary since it is not constituted by laws that track the interests of all citizens, but by 
material power. Thus, republican liberty considers equal co-determination as inevitable for 
liberty. Liberty so understood needs substantial political equality, which effectively enables all 
individuals to further their interest. Since oligarchs have greater means to further their interests 
politically oligarchic power is understood as liberty limiting.  
 
While Pettit considers inclusive deliberation and contestation as necessary to safeguard 
liberty, we have seen from the analysis by Winters that material power can undermine formal 
rights. A liberal democratic society that faces a huge concentration of power resting in the hands 
of a wealthy minority faces the problem that the institutions structuring people’s private lives, 
and influencing their individual prospects to pursue their goals, are to a huge extent determined 
by the wealth of a minority that pursues the maintenance and expansion of their own materially 
superior position. This creates intensive domination of those lacking the material means. As 
Winters points out, the material power, due to its versatility, is not disrupted by formal political 
rights. If material power can circumvent formal rights, republican liberty requires finding ways 
to prevent that. In order to ensure that the laws track the interests of all citizens, liberty 
necessitates safeguards against economic domination. The remainder of this paper is devoted 
to this very question. 
 
 
Chapter 2 
A Proposal to Safeguard Liberty 
 
In the last chapter I showed that liberal democracies suffer from increasing inequality 
in material wealth. Winters’ definition of oligarchic power has laid the foundations to argue 
that the increasing concentration of wealth is a threat to liberty. That is because political co-
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determination – as important for ensuring liberty – is undermined if an unelected minority of 
society is influencing democratic decisions more significantly than the rest of society.  
Dedicating himself to that problem Alan Thomas (2017), in his recent book Republic of 
Equals: Predistribution and Property-owning Democracy, proposes a comprehensive theory 
that aims at giving a feasible solution for liberal societies that face the threat of a loss of liberty 
by dominating economic elites. Thomas suggests rearranging the economic institutions such 
that democratic equality is guaranteed. This he sees met by the institutions of a property-owning 
democracy, henceforth referred to as POD, that characterises especially by the widespread 
dispersion of capital among citizens. Thomas claims that POD is superior to other types of 
economic organization because POD is not only structuring social interaction such that 
outcomes are just, but he also sees it mastering the task to reconcile economic efficiency with 
democratic equality (Thomas, 2017: Ch. 2). Thomas states that his proposal accommodates 
decentralized economic exchange, structurally prevents impermissible material inequalities and 
ensures democratic equality. Accordingly it seems to be a promising solution to the task to 
safeguard liberty in the face of oligarchic power. If Thomas’ proposal proves to be sufficient in 
structurally preventing domination, liberal societies should seriously consider implementing it 
given the recent threat to their most central value: individual liberty (Thomas, 2017: 86, 128, 
368).  
Thomas’ theory is composed of three main theses:3 1) The complementary thesis states that 
a synthesis of Rawlsian liberalism and civic republicanism is superior to either one of the 
theories alone, because they support each other especially in their task to prevent oligarchic 
power (Thomas, 2017: 10). While Thomas endorses Pettit’s version of republican liberty, the 
content of his theory is mainly made up of Rawls’ theory of justice, with him endorsing Rawls’ 
principles of justice. Thomas’ 2) over-determination thesis states that the institutions of POD 
follow from each of Rawls’ principles (Thomas, 2017: 95). In his 3) uniqueness thesis Thomas 
claims that POD is the only socioeconomic framework in which liberal republican values can 
be realized, defending it against Welfare State Capitalism [henceforth WSC] and Liberal 
Socialism (Thomas, 2017: 94, 134). In this chapter I will outline the most important arguments 
for Thomas’ theory by discussing his complementary thesis (1) and his over-determination 
thesis (2). In the subsequent chapter I will address the feasibility of Thomas’ proposal. 
 
 
1) Complementary Thesis 
 
The basis of Thomas’ proposal consists of the combination of Rawlsian liberalism and 
Pettit’s republican notion of liberty. Even though liberalism and republicanism are often held 
to be rivals, Thomas argues that both views reinforce each other and are therefore 
complementary (Thomas, 2017: 15). That is – according to Thomas – first, because liberalism 
and republicanism have the same project. Second, they accommodate each other’s deficiencies. 
Third, their differences are not insurmountable. 
First, both liberalism and republicanism are political doctrines that aim to maximize 
individual liberty by means of an appropriate institutional design under the assumption of 
                                                      
3 I borrow the labelling of the three thesis from John Wilesmith and Nicolas Vrousalis. (Wilesmith, 2017; 
Vrousalis, Forthcoming) 
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reasonable pluralism. Thomas states that this is why both converge in their concern with 
economic inequality (Thomas, 2017: xv, 1). Republicanism considers economic inequality as 
liberty-limiting due to the resulting political domination, as stated in the previous chapter. 
Rawlsian liberalism, on the other hand, has an inbuilt concern for avoiding the concentration 
of wealth due to its principles of justice – of which more later. 
Secondly, Thomas claims that liberalism and republicanism cannot only be combined, 
but also that their combination is superior to either theory alone, because they can accommodate 
each other’s deficiencies (Thomas, 2017: 5). Thomas considers the notion of liberty in Rawls’ 
theory as not strong enough to explicate the full set of requirements necessary for it to be 
guaranteed (Thomas, 2017: 18). Republicanism, on the other hand, is improved by liberalisms 
ability to stress the implications needed for the procedure in which citizens’ real interests are 
determined (Thomas, 2017: 17). While Thomas’ claim cannot feasibly be read as solving actual 
deficiencies of either theory, it only makes sense understood as a mutually supportive 
combination that serves especially well to guarantee liberty within liberal democracies 
(Thomas, 2017: 19). If that is what Thomas means, he made a valuable combination by 
endorsing a hybrid theory appropriate for the goal of equal liberty in the light of oligarchic 
power. However, he writes as if his proposal can solve actual deficiencies, which would be less 
successful ( cf. Thomas, 2017: xvi, 17-19).  
I begin by outlining how Thomas considers liberalism improved by the 
complementation with republicanism. Rawls’ most important principle is liberty (Rawls, 1971: 
220). He considers especially equal political liberty inevitable to ensure that all citizens have 
equal liberty. Rawls calls that the fair value of political liberties. That is: all individuals should 
have equal political power to influence the political process. The fair value proviso is further 
guaranteed if citizens have their highest-order interests satisfied (Rawls, 1971: 111). Rawls 
states that citizens are primarily interested in being able to be reasonable and rational, which is 
constitutive for their status of citizenship by means of which they are able to be effective 
political agents. This in turn guarantees that citizens are able to make use of their political 
liberties. In short, individuals’ highest-order interests express the desire to have the conditions 
satisfied to be free.4  
Thomas sees this as problematic because Rawls has not specified his notion of liberty (Thomas, 
2017: 17). This can be understood as follows: assuming that Rawls endorsed negative liberty, 
citizenship would require mere non-interference by the state. Thomas points out that this, 
however, is not sufficient to guarantee citizen’s highest-order interests. For citizens to be 
equally capable to use their rationality and reasonableness, certain social and economic 
conditions need to be fulfilled. Only then they are able to effectively use their formal political 
rights (Kerr, 2012: 469-70). As an example: for a person to be able to entertain considerations 
about justice as well as life plans, it is not sufficient to guarantee mere non-interference. It is 
necessary that she additionally enjoys a decent social and economic minimum – like sufficient 
subsistence and education – in order for her to be able to be a reasonable and rational person 
who can make effective use of her political rights. These social and economic conditions would, 
                                                      
4 Persons are, according to Rawls, rational and reasonable beings as a consequence of which they have the 
two moral powers, that are the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good 
(Rawls, 1971: 112-13). That is, rational and reasonable individuals are able to choose just principles that 
structure social cooperation, and are able to make their individual plans in life, i.e. to form a conception of 
the good and considering the necessary means to this end (Rawls, 1993: 302). 
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however, not follow from, e.g. negative liberty. Thus, Thomas is right to state that Rawls’ 
requirement of the fair value of political liberties is appropriately supported by the republican 
notion of liberty. By demanding substantive political rights, republican liberty demands an 
institutional design that implies social and economic conditions in order to guarantee non-
domination. Citizens must be able to actively contest and deliberate, which makes such rights 
necessary (Thomas, 2017: 29).  
However, it is to say that this complementation is not an improvement on Rawls’ liberal theory, 
since Rawls already assumes these requirements. Rawls states that the notion of liberty he 
endorses has to “guarantee equally for all citizens the social conditions essential for the 
adequate development and the full and informed exercise of their two moral powers” (Rawls, 
1971: 112). Negative liberty as portrayed in the first chapter, would, thus, not be adequate for 
Rawls theory. Others, like Thomas Pogge , have stated that social and economic rights are 
already included in Rawls’ theory as required by the value of political liberties (Pogge, 1989: 
143-4). It therefore can be concluded that Thomas is not solving a deficiency of Rawls’ liberal 
theory. However, he is right to state that republican liberty fits well within Rawls’ theory 
because it emphasises the institutional requirements of ensuring the fair value of political 
liberties (Thomas, 2017: 15).  
Thomas considers republicanism supported in the procedure in which the notion of 
domination is determined. While he states that liberalism would certify the procedures as just 
by providing an independent standard of fairness (Thomas, 2017: 15), he points to the 
following: As I outlined in the first chapter, republican liberty demands that institutions track 
citizens’ real interests in order for them to enjoy non-domination. This is made possible by 
guaranteeing citizens adequate procedures for contestation and deliberation. From that it 
follows that the exact notion of domination is determined by procedures of contestation and 
deliberation. These procedures guaranteeing that citizens’ interests are tracked.  
However, since it is impossible to design institutions such that they track the interests of every 
single citizen, Pettit states that they track the common interests (Pettit, 2004: 156) which are 
“those interests that citizens share in their role as citizens” (Harbour, 2012: 197). This means 
that citizens are given the proper possibility of contestation. Laws and political decisions are 
arrived at not by consensus, but by bearing up against the contestation of citizens (Pettit, 1997: 
278). The common interest of all citizens is to have appropriate possibilities for contestation. 
Thus, what counts as domination in a society is determined by contestation.  
Now, Thomas considers it necessary that the procedures by which the notion of domination is 
determined have an independent standard of fairness. He states that in order to make sure that 
procedures are fair – i.e. everyone can equally contest and deliberate – republicanism should 
be supplemented with Rawls’ highest-order interests (Thomas, 2017: 17). According to 
Thomas, the highest-order interests indicate the necessary requirements that all citizens should 
have equally guaranteed in order to have the ability to determine the notion of domination. The 
highest-order interests are thus specifying Pettit’s common interests. 
However, Thomas is not ‘solving’ a problem, but rather explicating what is necessarily implied 
in Pettit’s theory. There is no actual difference between citizens who are in a position to use 
their highest-order interests and citizens who are able to contest and deliberate. The latter 
implies the former: in order to deliberate and contest, citizens need to be able to form their own 
opinions for which they need to use their rationality and reasonableness. If citizens’ highest-
order interests are not guaranteed it seems impossible for them to be able to contest and 
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deliberate. Even though Thomas is right that Rawls’ notion of highest-order interests can serve 
as a specification of Pettit’s common interests, I reject that this would fill a gap in Pettit’s 
theory, as Thomas claims (Thomas, 2017: 16). It rather specifies what is already implied.  
Despite Thomas being wrong in stating that he solved a deficiency, he is right in stating 
that the two views are compatible (Thomas, 2017: 15). Both views explicitly underline what 
the other view implicitly assumes. However, while Thomas is wrong to conclude from this that 
a liberal-republican hybrid is superior to either theory alone, it is plausible that the 
complementariness of both theories serves well to indicate an appropriate institutional design 
to guarantee liberty in a liberal democratic society.  
Third, the hybrid is possible because the difference between the two views is 
unproblematic for a synthesis (Thomas, 2017: 11, 29). A crucial difference between liberalism 
and republicanism is civic virtue which is the active political and public engagement of citizens 
to strengthen the commonwealth (Thomas, 2017: 29). Citizen virtue is an instrumental value in 
order to ensure liberty. The reason for this is that laws need to track the interests of citizens in 
order to guarantee freedom. If citizens are not actively engaging in the political process, the 
laws are not able to track their interests which means that they are not promoting liberty. In that 
sense, the virtue of an active citizenry is instrumentally valuable to guarantee liberty.  
Liberalism would deny that guaranteeing liberty involves prescribing values to individuals 
which they should endorse privately. That is because liberalism’s strict neutrality towards 
individuals’ private lives would not allow that their liberty is tied to such a condition (cf. Taylor, 
1995: 60-2). Thomas solution is to take civic virtue as option value (Thomas, 2017: xvi), by 
which he understands the following: citizens should have the possibility of contestation and 
deliberation, however, it is not required that citizens use this possibility. If they are not actively 
engaging in politics their liberty is ensured by the mere possibility that they could actively 
engage if they wanted. Thomas mitigates the notion of instrumentality by stating that it is not 
required to ensure liberty. He further considers the instrumental notion of civic virtue reflected 
by the Rawlsian notion of citizenship that also demands the possibility for citizens to actively 
make use of their political rights, which is demanded by the fair value proviso (Thomas, 2017: 
29). While the republican instrumentality of this value seems to have some importance in order 
to guarantee liberty (otherwise it cannot be guaranteed that laws track citizens’ real interests 
which would lead to domination), Thomas assumes that, as long as the possibility prevails for 
all to contest and deliberate, their liberty is ensured (Thomas, 2017: 7). If no one contests or 
deliberates, citizens’ real interests are tracked by the laws.5 
                                                      
5 This seems straightforwardly plausible. However, there is a problem arising from the combination of 
politically inactive citizens and Pettit’s definition of real interests. Pettit states that manipulation is also a 
form of domination. However, if the evaluative notion of interests should be avoided, a republican cannot 
assume what a person’s real interest would have been if the person were not subject to manipulation. This is 
especially problematic once the importance of an active citizenry is mitigated, as Thomas proposes by 
advocating option values. Consider the following example: All citizens enjoy a sufficient subsistence and 
appropriate rights and possibilities for contestation and deliberation. However, most citizens are reluctant to 
participate in politics because it might seem too time-consuming or they are more interested in spending their 
time otherwise. Thomas would probably consider these as valid reasons for citizens to choose not to endorse 
the optional value to defend their interests politically, because it would be up to citizens’ own responsibility 
to choose to actively engage in politics. However, in fact, these citizens are structurally manipulated by a 
minority of a society that aims at discouraging the majority of society from actively engaging in the political 
process; that gives the minority the possibility to effectively structure the institutions along the lines of their 
own vested interests. Tocqueville (1981) describes such a situation as mild despotism. Mild despotism is 
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Thus, Thomas’ complementary thesis is feasible since liberalism and republicanism are 
combinable in regard to their concern for an institutional design that ensures liberty. If Thomas’ 
claim of the superiority of a hybrid is understood as ‘serving his task well’ and not as ‘solving 
internal problems of the theories’, I conclude that Thomas makes a plausible case. In the next 
section I will elaborate on the institutional design that Thomas proposes in order to safeguard 
liberty in a liberal democratic society.  
   
 
2. Over-Determination Thesis 
 
Most of the content of Thomas’ theory is based on Rawls’ liberal theory for a just society 
(Rawls, 1971, 1993, 2001). Rawls takes account of the concept of POD as possible economic 
institutions to realize his principles of justice. The concept of POD originates from the 
economist James Meade (1964). While Rawls did not specify how a well-ordered society could 
be realized within POD, Thomas sets himself the task of showing how the institutions of POD 
realize the principles of justice. It will become apparent to those who are familiar with Rawls’ 
theory that Thomas’ interpretation diverges slightly from Rawls. While I will address some 
deviations from Rawls I will, for reasons of space, not explicitly elaborate on the differences 
between Thomas and Rawls. Further, Thomas’ notion of POD originates but slightly diverges 
from Meade and Rawls which will also not be addressed. In this chapter I will first outline 
Thomas’ concept of POD. Thereafter I will discuss Thomas’ view of the relation between POD 
institutions and the principles of justice.  
Thomas states that the institutional design of POD aims at equalizing the economic 
bargaining power of all individuals, so that domination by powerful economic actors is 
prevented (Thomas, 2017: 80). By that he means that the institutions of POD structurally ensure 
that economic transactions have fair outcomes (Thomas, 2017: 89). While POD emphasises 
private ownership of capital the institutions prevent large accumulations of wealth from 
occurring (Thomas, 2017: 86, 128, 368). The concept of capital includes here material wealth 
– e.g. property, income, assents, shares, etc. –social capital, – e.g. political citizenship – 
(Thomas, 2017: 146), as well as human capital – e.g. the marketable value of an individual’s 
capacity to work (Thomas, 2017: 161). Unique to POD is that capital dispersion is reached by 
means of pre-distribution (Thomas, 2017: 23, 161). Pre-distribution is the pre-emptive dispersal 
of productive capital that means capital is dispersed before material wealth can concentrate 
(Thomas, 2017: 23, 161). Following Martin O’Neill (O’Neill, 2009: 382) the institutional 
design of POD can be split into three categories of policy types: 
 
                                                      
when individuals would consider themselves to be in power, because they have popular sovereignty in the 
form of formal rights. Tocqueville states that in fact they are in tutelage, since others are shaping the 
institutions according to their interests. The only way to prevent such a situation is, according to Tocqueville, 
by means of an active political culture. This is not problematic for Thomas who would not recognize such a 
situation as domination because the institutions are in place for citizens to contest and deliberate. Still, bear 
in mind that the mitigation of citizen virtue can have far-reaching consequences for republican liberty. On 
the problem of manipulation in republicanism see: (Harbour, 2012: 195); On mild despotism see: 
(Tocqueville, 1981: 385). 
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(i) Widespread Dispersal of Capital: Central for POD is widespread dispersal, especially 
of material and human capital, because it is thought to be a means for ensuring equal 
social capital (Thomas, 2017: 146). Human capital is dispersed by means of a publicly 
funded high quality education and a universal healthcare system (Thomas, 2017: 168). 
Material capital is dispersed by a whole range of progressive taxation schemes as well 
as by policies such as a society-wide unit trust, a demogrant scheme, collective holding 
of equity, a sovereign wealth fund managed by the state, or a pension fund (Thomas, 
2017: xx, 168, 170, 252, 260, 291). While these are just options for this policy type, 
Thomas states that the exact policies should be determined democratically (Thomas, 
2017: 137). 
(ii) Blocking the Intergenerational Transmission of Advantage: In order to ensure 
widespread dispersion of capital over time, POD endorses progressive inheritance 
taxes, as well as high taxes on capital gifts. This is accompanied by pre-distributive 
measures like publicly funded high-quality education that seek to counteract 
advantages due to initial social positions (Thomas, 2017: 168).  
(iii) Safeguards against the Corruption of Policies: While (i) and (ii) already counteract the 
undue influence of wealthy elites on politics, Thomas considers the former policy-types 
safeguarded by constitutionalizing a right to widespread capital-holding (Thomas, 
2017: 123 – 143). Since the democratic process is considered to be more easily 
corrupted, the constitution is thought to shield policies against undue influence by 
material power (Thomas, 2017: 279; Wilson, 2017). 
 
Further it is the state’s role to make sure that capital-holding is widely dispersed 
(Thomas, 2017: xx, 90). That is why Thomas assigns the state the task of counteracting 
inadvertent and unforeseeable outcomes by adjusting the basic structure – i.e. the laws 
regulating a society (Thomas, 2017: 82). The state is thereby entitled to intervene in the 
distribution of goods in order to counterbalance unintended results (Thomas, 2017: 90). Due to 
his republican commitment, Thomas considers the strong role of the state unproblematic 
(Thomas, 2017: 10). I shall say more about this in the last chapter of this paper. What is 
important for the following discussion is Thomas’ claim that POD has the best economic 
institutions to accommodate the principles. That is why Thomas needs to show that POD is 
informed and justified by the principles (Thomas, 2017: 91, 143, 326). The remainder of this 
chapter is devoted to this connection. Thomas argues that POD follows from each of the 
principles which is why he claims that the case for POD is overdetermined (Thomas, 2012: 95). 
In the following I will consider his arguments in order to find out whether POD provides the 
appropriate framework to accommodate the principles of justice. I will proceed by considering 
each principle seriatim.  
 
 
§1 Liberty 
 
Rawls’ first principle is defined as follows: “Each person has an equal claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to 
be guaranteed their fair value” (Rawls, 1993: 5, in Thomas, 2017: 35). As was already argued 
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in the previous section, Rawls states that individual liberty is protected if the fair value of 
political liberty is equally guaranteed to all individuals. The fair value proviso demands that all 
individuals can effectively express their real interests and thereby converges with the republican 
requirements for individual liberty because both concepts demand substantive political rights. 
Even though it should be clear from the discussion of the previous chapter that liberty 
necessitates the prevention of the concentration of capital, which is why it welcomes policies 
aiming at capital dispersion, I will briefly elaborate Thomas’ arguments: While Rawls suggests 
the strategy to insulate politics from the influence of wealthy elites by measures of publicly 
funded campaign financing, anti-corruption laws and publicly funded parties (Rawls, 2001: 
149–50), Thomas considers these measures insufficient to safeguard liberty against the 
influence of material power (Thomas, 2017: 106-7). In light of Winters’ arguments of the 
versatility of material power, Thomas’ concern is well-founded. As we have seen, protection 
against oligarchic structures demands more substantive equality since formal rights are 
vulnerable to being undermined by material power. That is, even if lobbying were prohibited, 
wealthy individuals could find other ways of lawfully defending their wealth, which would still 
put them in a position to enjoy a greater political influence than other citizens. In order to 
guarantee liberty, Thomas considers it necessary that wealth concentration is prevented from 
occurring (Thomas, 2017: xviii, 111). The above stated policy types of POD employ not only 
measures to reach the constitutional aim of widespread capital (iii), which is to be long term 
achieved by (i)-policy types and (ii)-policy types.  
Thus, POD not only pursues measures to prevent politics from corruption by private 
actors but also explicitly aims at the widespread dispersion of wealth by means of which its 
institutions express the intention to ensure liberty (Thomas, 2017: 105–11). In the last chapter 
I will address the ability of the institutional design of POD to achieve that aim. For now, we 
can conclude that its institutions express the intention to do so. 
 
 
§2 Fair Equality of Opportunity  
 
The second principle is the principle of fair equality of opportunity [henceforth: FEO],  
which states that “[s]ocial and economic inequalities are […] to be attached to positions and 
offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1993: 5-6, in 
Thomas, 2017: 116).  
It demands, according to Thomas, that citizens with the same native endowments are 
able to compete on equal grounds (Thomas: 2017: 117). That implies measures to equalize the 
initial social starting position. This is ensured by (ii)-type policies as they include the 
distribution of human capital. Human capital promotes individuals’ marketable value, by means 
of education. The competitiveness of individuals is further equalized if material capital is 
prevented from being transferred to the next generation (Thomas, 2017: 116–20). That will 
prevent some from using their inherited wealth to outdo others who would be equally endowed 
for the same career. However, equal chances for equal talents does not require continuous 
access to capital. O’Neill argues in that regard that once individuals have acquired their social 
position, the FEO would not mandate providing them with further opportunities (O’Neill, 2009: 
385). Accordingly, neither widespread capital holding – i.e. (i)-type policies – nor measures to 
safeguard the political process against the influence of material power – i.e. (iii)-type policies 
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– are required. That suggests that ‘equal starting gate theories’ demanding equal opportunities 
at the beginning of individuals’ lifetime, would be sufficient for realizing the FEO. Thus, even 
if POD can accommodate the FEO, the full gamut of POD-policies is not necessary for its 
realization.  
Secondly it is important to mention that Thomas’ interpretation of the FEO principle 
diverges from Rawls, who considers the principle not contingent on morally arbitrary factors 
like native endowments (Rawls, 1971: 64). However, Thomas states that his theory is still not 
contingent on native endowments because the difference principle equalizes the FEO (Thomas, 
2017: 121). That is because Thomas, in contrast to Rawls, considers the principles not to be in 
a lexical order but as equally important (Thomas, 2017: 121). However, considering his 
republican commitment, Thomas must give liberty the highest priority. What he seems to argue 
for is that, while the FEO principle should make sure that those individuals with the same talents 
can compete on equal grounds, the third principle is to make sure that people’s rewards are not 
contingent on morally arbitrary factors (Thomas: 2017: 120-122, 172-173). I will say more 
about this in the following paragraph.  
 
 
§3 Difference Principle 
 
Rawls’ third principle states that inequalities in the distribution of basic goods are to be 
to the greatest advantage of the least well-off (Rawls, 1993: 6; in Thomas, 2017: 35).6 The 
difference principle is considered an expression of reciprocity (Thomas, 2017: 42-4, 139-43). 
The understanding of reciprocity here in question is based on the idea that all members are 
fundamentally equal to each other, which is based on equal recognition (Thomas, 2017: 145). 
Equal recognition means to respect others as equal. To be able to respect other individuals as 
equals one needs to be able to respect oneself (Thomas, 2017: 145). To be able to have self-
respect, certain social and economic conditions need to be fulfilled, as was explained in the first 
section of this chapter. The social basis of self-respect is provided by an equal status of 
citizenship, which comes with equal rights; The economic basis is provided by the difference 
principle, that says that all are entitled to an equal share of the fruits of cooperative labour, 
unless inequality is to the advantage of the least well-off. Thus, the difference principle is to 
provide the economic basis constitutive of self-respect and is thereby an expression of an 
egalitarian notion of reciprocity (Thomas, 2017: 145, 47, 48, 114, 229). The conception of 
reciprocity here in question is borrowed from Stuart White’s fair dues conception of reciprocity 
that states: 
 
“Each person is entitled to a share of the economic benefits of social cooperation 
conferring equal opportunity (or real freedom) in return for the performance of an equal 
handicap-weighted quantum of contributive activity” (White, 1997: 318; in Thomas, 
2017: 30).  
 
                                                      
6 Due to Rawls’ assumptions of chain-connectedness and close-knits not only the least-advantaged are 
benefitting, but all members of society (Rawls, 1971: 82; cf. Thomas, 2017: Ch. 2). 
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From the fair dues conception of reciprocity follows that the distribution of basic goods is not 
contingent on morally arbitrary factors like native endowments or social starting positions. That 
is because from the assumption that a society is a cooperative venture it follows that each 
member is entitled to a fair share of the overall output (Thomas, 2017: 102). Due to the 
fundamental equality of all members the fair share is not to be contingent on morally arbitrary 
factors like native endowments and initial social starting positions (Rawls, 1971: 64). This 
includes that the distribution of goods should also not be contingent on talent. Accordingly, the 
fair dues conception Thomas endorses measures the reward against that which individuals are 
able to contribute to society. The fair dues conception is thus not contingent on morally arbitrary 
factors and expresses the egalitarian commitment to ensure the economic basis for equal self-
respect. 
Simone Chambers states in this regard that while this contradicts our beliefs that talents should 
be rewarded, we would have to equally consider talents as morally irrelevant for the distribution 
of basic goods if we consider gender and initial social starting positions as morally arbitrary 
factors (Chambers, 2012: 24-27).7 While the FEO answers to our intuition that effort and talent 
should be rewarded, the difference principle embodies the egalitarian demand that every 
member in a cooperative society is entitled to a fair share, which is not contingent on morally 
arbitrary factors like talents (Chambers, 2012: 26). The notion of reciprocity here employed is 
thus an expression of solidarity, i.e. not wanting more unless it benefits others as well. 
If the difference principle is to ensure the material basis for equal self-respect, it cannot be 
understood to merely redress income inequality, because huge inequalities would still prevail 
due to underlying wealth. Accordingly, the difference principle demands that individuals are 
substantially equal in their possession of material power. The consideration is that reciprocity, 
which is fair interaction, is only possible if individuals can interact on equal terms. For 
individuals to interact on equal terms they need equal bargaining power. Accordingly, fair 
interaction between equal members of a society can only eventuate if the holding of capital is 
equalized. The assumption is that individuals need to have a certain level of equal economic 
power in order to perceive themselves as equals to others (Rawls, 19971: 139). In that way, the 
difference principle mandates the equalization of underlying wealth as well as non-human 
capital (O’Neill, 2012: 80). POD can account for that by its pre-distributive measures that aim 
at equalizing the bargaining power for individuals before they engage in economic interaction, 
more of which in the next chapter.  
Thus, the difference principle demands the economic basis for self-respect necessary for 
reciprocity, it demands policies that equalize the economic bargaining power of all individuals 
so that they can engage in fair interaction (Thomas, 2017: 43). In that way, measures for 
ongoing and stable dispersion of capital follow from the difference principle. The policy types 
of POD (i)-(iii) pursue the widespread dispersion of human and non-human capital across 
generations in a stable way and therefore support the intentions of the difference principle 
(Thomas, 2017: 95). Thus, POD follows from the difference principle. 
 
                                                      
7 Like Brian Berkey (Berkey, 2015: 851) I refer to Cohen’s understanding of talented individuals, who “are 
so positioned that, happily for them, they do command a high salary and they can vary their productivity 
according to exactly how high it is” (Cohen, 2008: 120). 
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 I conclude that the over-determination thesis is not defendable in the way Thomas 
claims since POD institutions are not demanded by each principle separately. While liberty and 
the difference principle activate the full package of POD-typical policy types (i)-(iii) and thus 
make a plausible case for its framework, the FEO principle requires far less than ongoing, 
widespread distribution of capital. But still all principles can be accommodated by POD’s 
policy types. Seen as a whole, POD provides sufficient support for all of the three principles 
together and as such it seems to be a plausible framework for the implementation of the 
principles of justice. From this Thomas sets out the uniqueness thesis, stating that POD is the 
only regime in which the three principles can be realized (Thomas, 2017: xviii, xix, 68, 89, 95). 
In the next chapter I will first outline Thomas’ motivation for the uniqueness thesis, before I 
discuss his charges against WSC and Liberal Socialism. In the last section I will turn to Thomas’ 
proposal in order to ascertain whether it is sufficient to accomplish the assigned task to 
guarantee liberty as necessary for a liberal democratic society.  
 
 
Chapter 3 
New Economic Institutions 
 
The aims of this chapter will be twofold: first, I will address the inner coherence of Thomas’ 
proposal; second, I will consider its ability to guarantee liberty. Since I will consider in the first 
part the solidity of the uniqueness thesis I will engage with Thomas’ arguments against WSC 
and Liberal Socialism seriatim after I outlined Thomas’ motivation to reject other regimes. 
Building on the counterarguments against WSC and Liberal Socialism I will consider in the 
second part whether POD is able to prevent large accumulations of wealth and thus ensure the 
type of liberty in question. But first I want to give some background information on Thomas’ 
overall understanding of the role that POD plays in the implementation of justice. This will be 
helpful in order to understand his objections against WSC and Liberal Socialism. 
Thomas frames the discussion on the necessity of POD as a failure of the principles if they 
are not implemented within the ‘appropriate’ regime (Thomas, 2017: 105). He claims that the 
principles would lead to unjust outcomes if they did not have the right background context, by 
which he means the correct economic institutions. This claim seems odd considering that 
Thomas endorses pure procedural justice (Thomas, 2017: 90). Pure procedural justice is that 
just procedures lead to just outcomes (Rawls, 1971: 74-6). The characteristic of pure procedural 
justice is that the procedure determines the just result. This is why the procedure must be carried 
out (Rawls, 1971: 75). For example, the fair result of a football game cannot be determined 
before the procedure of the game has taken place. If the procedure is fair, the result of a football 
game will be just regardless of the distribution of scores. Now, Thomas claims that only POD 
is able to allow the just working of the principles (Thomas, 2017: 94). However, this claim 
suggests the following question: if the principles express pure procedural justice, how could 
they ever lead to unjust outcomes regardless of whether POD institutions are in place or not? 
There are two possible interpretations of this claim. Discussing them will clarify what Thomas 
intends to say by making this counterfactual claim: Interpretation one suggests that Thomas 
considers the choice of the economic institutional design to be a necessary requirement for a 
just society (Thomas, 2017: 105). This interpretation seems likely because he frames the 
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discussion as if POD would be necessary for the principles to work properly (Thomas, 2017: 
209). However, if the principles themselves are insufficient for justice, the economic 
institutions seem to represent a further necessary principle in order for a society to be just 
(Wilson, 2017). This is unlikely, especially because Thomas derives POD from the principles. 
If the principles of justice are insufficient to realize a just society, and POD is derived from the 
principles, then POD must be insufficient to realize a just society. That suggests the second 
interpretation: POD is simply the best regime to realize the principles because it has an 
appropriate institutional design that expresses the intentions of the principles. This 
interpretation can be explained as follows: Rawls states that even if a society adopts principles 
that express pure procedural justice, it will lead over time to the undermining of background 
justice, which is why he considers adjustments in the basic structure as necessary (Rawls, 1993: 
284). That is, rules have to be inscribed in the basic structure that make adjustments possible 
so that the institutions of the basic structure remain just over time. Thomas considers the 
institutions of POD to provide that background context sufficient for the pure procedural 
working of the principles of justice (Thomas, 2017: 40, 137, 164). 
Further, Thomas considers the institutions of POD to be a defence against G. A. Cohen’s 
well-known critique (2008). Cohen objects that if the principles only apply to the institutions 
and not to individuals directly, they allow for justice-free zones that will incentivize agents to 
act in ways that create unjust outcomes (Cohen, 2008: 15; in Thomas, 2017: 71). Highly skilled 
individuals are, for example, incentivised to seek high rents for their productive contribution. 
This, as Cohen claims, will create unjust outcomes – in this case impermissible inequalities. 
Thomas states that POD avoids Cohen’s critique because even if individuals act unjust, the 
structures of POD will not allow for unjust outcomes (Thomas, 2017: 88-9). In that way Thomas 
considers domination structurally prevented (Thomas, 2017: 86, 128, 368). Secondly, Thomas 
considers Cohen’s critique to be undermined because of the following consideration about 
Rawls’ theory: While the primary subject of justice is the basic structure, the institutions of the 
basic structure shape the actions of individuals (Rawls, 1971: 259). Since Thomas considers 
POD to be an expression of solidarity (Thomas, 2017: 42-4, 139-43), he assumes that its 
institutions have an educative effect on individual behaviour (Thomas, 2017: 46, 143, 146, 208, 
306). This assumption is encouraged by Rawls who argues that “an economic regime, say, is 
not only an institutional scheme for satisfying existing desires and aspirations but a way of 
fashioning desires and aspirations in the future” (Rawls, 1993: 269). In that way Thomas 
considers POD to have an educative effect on citizens. I will return to this in the last section of 
this paper. What I wanted to clarify here is Thomas’ motivation to defend POD against the other 
regime types. Thomas considers WSC and Liberal Socialism as insufficient to satisfy the task 
of pure adjusted procedural justice as necessary for the pure procedural working of the 
principles. This should be kept in mind when I discuss in the following Thomas’ critique on 
Liberal Socialism and WSC, since orthodox Rawlsians might not consider it possible that the 
principles fail if implemented.  
Thus, Thomas’ endeavour is to consider the sufficiency of different regimes to express and 
support the principles by providing for a stable and just economic background that supports 
liberal republican values. He considers this to be solely realized by POD institutions. Before I 
address the sufficiency of POD to guarantee the assigned task of individual liberty, I will be 
concerned with the plausibility of his uniqueness thesis. In the following two subsections I will 
address each alternative regime type, starting with WSC. 
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1. Uniqueness Thesis  
 
In this section I will outline Thomas’ arguments that POD is the only socioeconomic regime 
within which the principles of justice can be realized. He contrasts this to WSC and liberal 
socialism. I will first outline Thomas’ most important line of argument and will then critically 
engage with it. While the discussion of WSC already exhibits that Thomas’ uniqueness thesis 
is built on unstable grounds, the engagement with Liberal Socialism will reveal that his critique 
is internally incoherent. 
 
 
§ 1 Welfare State Capitalism 
 
Thomas’ argument against WSC rests on the consideration that the difference principle 
could allow for inequalities that are not in accord with republican liberty if the economic 
institutions are designed as WSC (Thomas, 2017: 109). Thomas has two reasons for being 
concerned about impermissible inequalities: if inequalities prevail that reach an impermissible 
range, then a) redistribution limits individual self-respect (Thomas, 2017: 49) and b) oligarchic 
power would pose a threat to democratic equality (Thomas, 2017: 109). I mentioned these 
arguments over the course of the last chapters, which is why it might be already clear that both 
lead to the same conclusion: self-respect as necessary for perceiving oneself as an equal to 
others, and equal political co-determination as necessary to guarantee that the laws track the 
interests of the people, are both inevitable for guaranteeing republican liberty. Thus, a) and b) 
lead to the limitation of liberty. Thomas considers a) and b) possible outcomes of WSC because 
he assumes a specific institutional design, by which he follows Rawls’ ideal type of WSC 
institutions (Rawls, 2001: 137–8). To understand his criticism, we have to understand the notion 
of WSC here employed. Thereafter I will elaborate on the distinction between pre- and 
redistribution which is central for Thomas’ argument for the superiority of POD over WSC.  
Thomas understands the role of WSC institutions to mitigate income inequality by redressing 
welfare payments (Thomas, 2017: 193). As such WSC aims at distributing a decent social 
minimum to individuals so that no one falls below a certain threshold (Thomas, 2017: 190). 
Thomas thereby perceives WSC as a social insurance scheme that provides unearned 
subsistence as a worst-case payment to compensate calamities. That means that WSC 
redistributes for reasons of welfare which is why it would allow for huge differences in income 
and wealth. That is why Thomas states that if WSC is understood as a social insurance scheme 
it expresses an inegalitarian conception of reciprocity that White calls the strict proportionality 
conception of reciprocity: “one may take out only what one puts in or, relative to others, only 
in strict proportion to the value of what one puts in” (White 2003: 49; in Thomas, 2017: 181). 
This conception of reciprocity ties the amount of deserved goods to the condition of an 
equivalent contribution, i.e. quid pro quo distribution. In following Rawls, Thomas rejects such 
a distributive scheme with the argument that such a distribution would be contingent on morally 
arbitrary factors like native endowments which would not be in line with his understanding of 
reciprocity (Rawls, 1999: 57; in Thomas, 2017: 194). Thus, Thomas’ rejection of WSC is based 
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on the charge that its institutions fail to express a notion of reciprocity that is not contingent on 
morally arbitrary factors (Thomas, 2017: 193).  
As mentioned above, Thomas endorses the fair dues conception of reciprocity that is not 
contingent on morally arbitrary factors and thereby expresses the egalitarian goal to equalize 
brute luck (Sommer, 2016: 39). According to the strict proportionality conception of 
reciprocity, the talented would be entitled to receive the highest rewards. Thomas states that 
even if WSC institutions would promote (ii)-type policies (blocking intergenerational transfer 
of capital) to create equal starting positions, they would still allow for huge inequalities within 
a generation because the more talented would be entitled to receive more (Thomas, 2017: 172, 
181-2). This would further result in impermissible inequalities that would limit liberty. 
According to republican liberty all members of a society should be equally able to contest and 
deliberate (Thomas, 2017: xviii, 6, 21, 23, 86). This prohibits massive accumulations of wealth 
also within one generation. Thus, Thomas’ critique is that the strict proportionality conception 
of reciprocity is not an appropriate conception of reciprocity for an egalitarian society. From 
that it follows that if WSC institutions express such a notion of reciprocity it will allow for 
impermissible inequality that lead to the two concerns – a) to limit self-respect and b) to 
undermine co-determination – which in effect leads to the limitation of republican liberty.  
 Thomas argues that POD is superior because of its pre-distributive measures (Thomas, 
2017: 208). He considers pre-distribution to be superior because wealth is distributed ‘before’ 
impermissible inequalities emerge, which is why it forestalls market interaction. He claims that 
pre-distribution a) guarantees self-respect because wealth is pre-emptively dispersed and b) that 
oligarchic power is prevented from occurring because impermissible inequalities are prevented 
from emerging. Even though this argument seems intuitively plausible, the distinction between 
pre-distribution and redistribution, in practical terms, is not so clear. James Lindley Wilson 
(2017) notes in this regard that there is no difference between re- and pre-distribution, if they 
are understood temporally. That is because redistribution is needed in order to pre-distribute 
(Wilson, 2017). What is pre-distributed before some time t in the future, is redistributed after 
someone has generated the amount of capital at time t-1 in the past. The difference between pre-
and redistribution would, thus, be a matter of temporal perspective. That is, what is redistributed 
from the perspective of t-1 is pre-distributed from the perspective after t. Thus, the distribution 
is the same. If pre-distribution and redistribution are the same it suggests the worry that POD 
is open to the same deficiencies as WSC institutions. 
Answering Wilson’s remarks, Thomas rejects that the temporal distinction captures the true 
difference between the two terms. He states that their difference lies in their intention to shape 
the distributive institutions (Thomas, 2017a). In this regard, pre-distribution would be 
connected with ongoing economic rights that structurally prevent impermissible inequalities, 
while redistribution does not have this intention. However, the two concepts are still not 
contradistinguished as they describe different aspects of distribution: Redistribution describes 
the mechanism itself, e.g. distribution d from x to y. Pre-distribution describes the purpose of 
the distribution, – i.e. how the mechanism should be conducted – e.g. a distribution d from x to 
y prior to some t. However, while the former necessarily accompanies the latter, the latter can 
also collapse into the former.  
This concern becomes apparent if we consider the exact policy mechanisms Thomas endorses. 
To name a few: progressive wealth and income tax, inheritance tax, high levels of estate tax, 
taxing of capital gains and capital gifts (Thomas, 2017: 125, 158, 168, 170). Thomas’ 
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endorsement of a whole range of taxation schemes suggests the conclusion that pre-distribution 
necessarily includes redistribution. This is further supported by Meade, who states that 
education is basically redistribution (Thomas, 2017: 131). Thomas, however, considers 
education as one of the core pre-distributive measures. This suggests that pre-distribution 
simply specifies how redistribution should be conducted. Thus, pre-distribution would be a task 
specification of redistribution. Specifying the purpose of a certain sort of redistributive measure 
by giving it another name is not problematic per se, but rather helpful in order to emphasize the 
kind of redistribution in question. However, it becomes problematic if Thomas relies on this 
distinction in order to reject WSC as insufficient to realize liberty.8 
Proponents of WSC could argue in this regard that pre-distribution is just another kind of 
redistribution or a task specification of its kind. This conclusion is supported by Piketty who 
notes that pre- and redistribution are commonly misunderstood as two different concepts while 
they are actually complementary. “The logic of redistribution and the logic of opportunities, 
rights and participation must be pursued together” (Piketty, 2016). Therefore, if pre-distribution 
is just a task specification of redistribution, why would WSC institutions not be able to 
implement it? Thomas gives no answer as to why pre-distribution is an exclusive mechanism 
of POD, which makes the rejection of WSC sound like a strawman argument.  
At this point I want to come back to the ideal type of WSC institutions by which Thomas 
follows Rawls (Rawls, 2001: 137–8). What Thomas considers an ideal type of WSC faces the 
critique of being a stipulative definition that serves the purpose of showing the superiority of 
POD. Paul Weithman points out that the notion of ideal types neither portrays actually existing 
WSC institutions, nor that type of institutional design that would be the most morally desirable 
version of it (Weithman, 2013). Also, O’Neill argues that Rawls’ conception of WSC is a 
strawman idealization that draws the picture of a worst-case scenario rather than an egalitarian 
version of it (O’Neill, 2012: 83). This underlines the worry that Thomas’ rejection of WSC is 
built on thin ice. Considering that pre-distribution is a task specification of redistribution, it 
should be clear that WSC is in theory and in practice open to a variety of adjustments by means 
of which WSC would be able to equally employ pre-distributive measures. Looking at actually 
existing WSC systems we might further object that some of them seem to express the intention 
rather to endorse the egalitarian fair dues conception of reciprocity instead of, as Thomas 
claims, the strict proportionality conception. Thus, Thomas’ charges against WSC are built on 
a very narrow perception of such a regime type. In Thomas’ favour I want to concede that his 
worry about inegalitarian outcomes is not entirely unjustified. Thomas’ concern that WSC 
institutions do not express the right notion of reciprocity stems from increasing inequalities 
observable in liberal democracies, that also societies with WSC-type institutions were not able 
to escape. It should be mentioned that threshold theories, or some desert-based theories would 
allow for similar WSC-types as the one Thomas argues against. However, that does not exclude 
the possibility of an egalitarian form of WSC that endorses the fair dues conception of 
reciprocity. Thomas’ uniqueness thesis thus appears to be unstable and artificially construed as 
we could imagine that WSC would be equally able to express liberal republican values. In the 
                                                      
8 Also, O’Neill argues that there is an inherent distinction between the two concepts (cf. O’Neill, 2012: 88). 
However, while the theoretical distinction sounds plausible (forestalling market interaction), the practical 
difference is not given. That is because such a system can only be maintained by including redistribution. In 
that sense pre-distribution is, if not a kind of redistribution, an extension to it.  
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next section it shall become clear that Thomas uniqueness thesis is not only unstable but 
internally incoherent. 
 
 
§2 Market Socialist Systems 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, POD and WSC both equally emphasise private 
property, especially concerning the private possession of productive capital which is producing 
economic power and thus – if concentrated – political domination. While POD emphasizes the 
widespread private holding of capital producing economic power, we have seen that this might 
not be an aim of WSC per se. However, WSC is likely to be open for a task specification aiming 
at widespread distribution of the capital in question. Liberal Socialism shares with POD the aim 
of seeking to reduce economic domination in the economic sphere but sees the solution in 
subjecting productive capital to public determination by means of the state (Rawls, 2007: p. 
323). Rawls considered both POD and Liberal Socialism to be possible candidates for economic 
institutions within which a just society could be realized (Rawls, 1999: xv). Thomas, who 
objects that the principles could be realized in both systems, states that the principles are only 
realizable in POD (Thomas, 2017: xviii, xix, 68, 95). However, while he explicitly disagrees 
with Rawls (Thomas, 2017: xviii) he does not explicitly reject Liberal Socialism, but Mandatory 
Market Socialism [henceforth MMS] (Thomas, 2017: 217). MMS is, according to Thomas, a 
system that mandates that all firms are democratically managed and worker-owned (Thomas, 
2017: 200). Capital is owned by the state, while worker-owned firms lease capital by paying a 
fee to public banks (Schweikart, 2002). While the state is the owner of productive capital, the 
workers of all firms are entitled to keep the profit they produce. All workers decide 
democratically on the division of the firms’ profit among them (Thomas, 2017: 224-5). Thomas 
states that MMS fails to realize the principles because it encourages exploitation (Thomas, 
2017: Ch. 8). However, MMS is different to Liberal Socialism that includes free markets while 
the state regulates economic domination through productive capital by subjecting some 
components under its control so that the market is in conformity with democratic decisions 
(Rawls, 1971: 241-2). Even though it is questionable whether the rejection of MMS equally 
applies to Liberal Socialism, I will take Thomas’ rejection of the former as representative for 
the latter, since he states throughout the book that he rejects Liberal Socialism as a possible 
candidate to realize justice (Thomas, 2017: xviii). This suggests again the assumption that 
Thomas has picked a notion of Socialism that serves the task particularly well to show the 
superiority of POD. However, as will become clear from the following, the rejection of MMS 
has considerable problems. In the following I will show that Thomas’ contention with MMS 
leads to a dilemma:9 Thomas would have to accept POD as exploitative or he would have to 
reject his uniqueness thesis. Thereafter I will show that Thomas can only decide for one horn 
of the dilemma. Otherwise he would contradict a key part of his liberal republican theory, that 
is egalitarian reciprocity. I will conclude by stating that Thomas is unable to hold the uniqueness 
thesis which means that POD is not the only possible regime to realize liberal republican values. 
                                                      
9 I follow Vrousalis, Raekstad and Wilesmith in the rejection of Thomas’ uniqueness thesis (Vrousalis, 
forthcoming; Raekstad, 2017; Wilesmith, 2017).  
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Thomas argues that MMS is exploitative by putting forward the following definition of 
exploitation by drawing on N. S. Arnold (1994):  
 
A person x is exploited if the following three conditions are satisfied: 
a) Person x is not rewarded the value of her productive contribution 
b) Some other agent extracts the value that the agent realised  
c) Person x has no other realistic alternative (Thomas, 2017: 225) 
 
Thomas defines ‘productive contribution’ as that which a person would be rewarded under 
conditions of perfect competition (Thomas, 2017: 225). It is questionable that Thomas 
advocates perfect competition as that situation in which rewards are allocated fairly. In a 
situation of perfect competition, talented individuals would be rewarded much more than in a 
situation in which the Rawlsian principles obtain. Perfect competition allows talented 
individuals to ask for high rents in exchange for their work and is thereby not sensitive to the 
moral irrelevance of talent for the allocation of goods. Perfect competition is thus similar to the 
existing economic systems to which Thomas explicitly objects (Thomas, 2017: 93) and seeks 
to improve upon because he thinks they do not express egalitarian reciprocity (Raekstad, 2017: 
5). Thomas’ problematic definition of productive contribution already indicates the 
inconsistency that I will expose in this section. To do this I first want to outline Thomas’ 
argument against MMS. He argues that MMS is exploitative because individuals would be 
rewarded less than in actually existing economic systems (Raekstad, 2017). Thomas justifies 
this as follows: All workers in worker-owned firms decide democratically how the firm’s profit 
should be divided among them (Thomas, 2017: 227). Thomas states that this puts the more 
productive workers under the risk of being exploited by the less productive workers, because it 
is to be expected that in socialist firms the wages are more equal than in a free market economy 
(Thomas, 2017: 227). That means that especially highly skilled workers will not be able to 
demand high rents for their work, which they could in a perfectly competitive market. Thus 
condition a) is met since some workers in democratic firms are expected to extract less than 
they could, which will benefit other workers of the firm – thus condition b) is met. Thomas 
further states that workers’ job mobility will be limited in MMS (Thomas, 2017: 227). He 
considers the socialist job market less dynamic because firms are not as likely to hire new 
workers if all firms are owned by the workers, and new businesses are less likely to be started 
(Raekstad, 2017: 5). Thus, workers seem to be less flexible in finding new jobs, which meets 
thereby condition c). With that said, MMS meets the conditions a) – c) of the above stated 
conception of exploitation and is therewith exploitative. 
However, this conclusion leads to the following dilemma: either Thomas accepts that 
POD is exploitative as well or he has to drop his charges against MMS. In the following I will 
outline why the former would be the case if Thomas held on to the just stated notion of 
exploitation. Thereafter I will argue that Thomas’ argument against MMS would contradict his 
liberal republican values. But first I shall outline why Thomas’ argument against MMS is also 
against POD:  
If Thomas endorses the above stated notion of exploitation it would follow that POD is 
exploitative as well. That is because POD entails extensive measures of redistribution that are 
realized by taxation (Raekstad, 2017: 4). This implies that some individuals are expected to 
receive smaller rewards than in a situation of competitively efficient markets where highly 
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skilled professionals could demand high rents for their contributions. POD aims at preventing 
individuals from accumulating excessively more wealth than others – even if the value of 
individual contribution would be comparatively high. This is ensured by (i)- and (iii)-type 
policies aiming at the widespread dispersion of capital such that concentrations of wealth are 
within a permissible range. Thus, condition a) of the conception of exploitation is met due to 
policies (i) and (iii), which entail that some individuals in POD are likely to receive significantly 
less than the value of their productive contribution.  
The second condition is met because pre-distributive measures have the effect that other 
individuals will profit from the contribution of highly skilled individuals due to policies (i) and 
(ii) (Raekstad, 2017: 4). These policy types intend to disperse wealth across society and across 
generations. That is because (i)-type policies – dispersing capital widely – and (ii)-type policies 
– blocking the intergenerational transmission of capital – entail redistributive measures like 
progressive taxation, as well as pre-distributive measures, like a demogrant scheme, or publicly 
funded education and healthcare. As was argued in the previous section, pre-distribution 
equally necessitates redistributive mechanisms. These will necessarily make it so that some 
individuals profit from the productive contributions of others. Thus, condition b) is met because 
other individuals extract some of the value of skilled individuals’ contribution due to 
redistributive and pre-distributive measures.  
Further, individuals have no other realistic alternative than to pay high taxes since the dispersion 
of wealth is constitutive for a well-ordered society. That is why Thomas intends to 
constitutionalize widespread capital holding in order to safeguard it against change. That 
implies that these laws expressing POD institutions are out of reach of public deliberation and 
contestation (Wilson, 2017). From that it follows that a person in POD would have no choice 
than to make the contribution. Since individuals cannot contest the current laws they have no 
realistic alternative to receiving less than the full value of their productive contribution. Thus, 
condition c) is met.  Since all three conditions a) – c) of the conception of exploitation are met 
under a POD regime, POD is exploitative. That implies that Thomas is confronted with the 
dilemma to either abandon his uniqueness thesis or to abandon his own theory. He claims that 
MMS would fail to realize reciprocity due to being exploitative (Thomas, 2017: 245). If POD 
failed to realize reciprocity, it would fail to realize Rawls’ principles and could thus not be 
defended as an appropriate regime for a liberal democratic society.  
In the following I will show that, while Thomas’ POD is still a possible candidate for a 
liberal democratic society, he has to drop his charges against MMS and accept that it is also a 
competitor to realize liberal republican values. That is because the conception of exploitation 
Thomas employs comprises a notion of reciprocity that is not reconcilable with Thomas’ 
egalitarian aims (Wilesmith, 2017: 6). The notion of exploitation demands that a person should 
be rewarded the amount strictly proportional to her contribution. With that said, the notion of 
exploitation endorses the strict proportionality conception of reciprocity that Thomas rejected 
as insufficient in his discussion of WSC since it fails to realize liberal republican values. As I 
argued in the last section, the strict proportionality conception is contingent on morally arbitrary 
factors like native endowments. Since Thomas endorses republican liberty and suitably 
advocates the notion of the fair dues conception of reciprocity, he denies that a distribution is 
fair if it is contingent on morally arbitrary factors (Thomas, 2017: 121, 132, 171). Remember 
from the discussion on the difference principle in chapter 2 that all individuals are 
fundamentally equal and are in a cooperative relationship, which is why no individual person 
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is entitled to more than any other individual, but only if greater gains are beneficial for the 
worst-off. The conception of reciprocity implicit in the conception of exploitation justifies that 
talented individuals receive more and is, thus, not reconcilable with Thomas’ egalitarian aims. 
As was argued before, the strict proportionality conception is not coherent with the aims of 
republican liberty. Once again, republican liberty demands equal citizenship that requires that 
all have equal co-determination. This involves, as was thoroughly argued in the first chapter, 
that economic inequalities are within a permissible range. It would not be permitted that some 
individuals could acquire impermissible amounts of wealth and would thereby have over-
proportional influence over the political process, as would be allowed by the strict 
proportionality conception of reciprocity. In order to ensure republican liberty, a notion of 
reciprocity has to ensure equal citizenship. This, in turn, requires a fair distribution that is not 
contingent on morally arbitrary factors.  
Thus, Thomas cannot employ a notion of exploitation that contradicts his egalitarian 
commitments since it implies a conception of reciprocity that is contingent on morally arbitrary 
factors and could not realize republican liberty. Since Thomas’ argument against MMS is 
incoherent he has to abandon the claim that POD is the only possible framework within which 
liberal republican values can be realized. Therefore, Thomas’ uniqueness thesis fails. 
 
In this section, I argued that Thomas’ rejection of WSC is built on the distinction 
between pre- and redistribution. This distinction is not contradictory which means that also 
advocates of WSC could defend pre-distributive policies. WSC institutions are likely be a 
candidate for realizing the principles of justice because Thomas argues against a notion that is 
not representative of WSC-type regimes. As a consequence, Thomas’ uniqueness thesis is likely 
to be rejected by an egalitarian defender of WSC. What is more, Thomas’ uniqueness thesis is 
also incoherent since he defends it with two different notions of reciprocity. Rejecting MMS as 
exploitative leads him into the dilemma of contradicting his own values, which is why the 
uniqueness thesis has to be abolished. Thus, WSC, MMS and especially Liberal Socialism –
which Thomas dismisses without consideration – are still possible candidates to realize liberty. 
In the next section I will intensify this argument by questioning the sufficiency of POD 
institutions to accomplish the set task of guaranteeing liberty sufficient for a liberal democratic 
society.  
 
 
2. Solidarity, Efficiency and Constitutional Securing 
 
 I argued in the last section that WSC as well as Liberal Socialism cannot be dismissed 
as possible candidates for realizing the principles of justice. As I pointed out in the beginning 
of this chapter, Thomas’ criticisms of the two regimes are motivated by his concern for pure 
adjusted procedural justice. Thomas assumes that WSC and Liberal Socialism are insufficient 
to deal with different hazards. The charge is that if these regimes were open to these hazards, 
they would not be sufficient to function as economic institutions ensuring the kind of 
background justice as is required for pure procedural justice. In other words, the economic 
institutions should ensure that impermissible concentrations of wealth are prevented from 
occurring. The claim is, thus, that only a regime that is able prevent concentrations of wealth 
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from occurring can be a sufficient economic framework within which purely just procedures 
inevitably lead to just outcomes. Thomas criticises Liberal Socialism and WSC because the 
institutions encourage (or are not able to prevent) individual actions which would lead to the 
concentration of impermissible amounts. While I already pointed out that Thomas’ rejection of 
the other two regimes is incoherent, his concerns are worth considering because they are in line 
with the overall task of this paper. If economic institutions encourage (or are not able to prevent) 
impermissible concentrations of wealth, they are not sufficient to guarantee liberty in a liberal 
democratic society. As I argued in the first chapter of this paper, wealth concentration is a threat 
to equal co-determination and thereby a threat to liberty. In this regard, I have set myself the 
task of considering whether the institutional design of POD could be a possible solution for 
liberal democratic societies. Accordingly, this chapter is devoted to discussing the sufficiency 
of Thomas’ POD to realize liberty. If POD turns out to be able to prevent concentrations of 
wealth from occurring it will be sufficient to function as pure procedurally just background 
institutional design and would thus be sufficient to guarantee liberty. However, if POD is likely 
to allow for concentrations it cannot provide the background institutions for pure procedural 
justice. That is because pure procedural justice demands that outcomes are inevitably fair. If 
POD allows for outcomes that are not fair, it will not be sufficient as a framework to realize 
liberal republican values and is insufficient to realize liberty (cf. Edmundson, 2017: 140-1). Put 
differently, economic institutions that would undermine one of the principles, namely liberty, 
cannot function as an appropriate framework to realize the principles of justice. As a result, 
they would be insufficient for a liberal democratic society. 
 My strategy is the following: First, I briefly revise how POD is supposed to ensure 
widespread capital holding. Secondly, I show Thomas’ assumptions on individual behaviour, 
which he claims institutions should be ready to address. Third, I will discuss whether Thomas’ 
institutional design is able to respond to that behaviour along the following lines: it will be clear 
from the discussion that POD’s institutional strategy comes down to the constitutional securing. 
Thomas argues on two grounds that a constitution can prevent the assumed human behaviour 
from resulting in impermissible inequalities. First, because of the regulatory role of the state 
and secondly, because of the educative effect of institutions on citizens’ behaviour. I will reject 
these arguments as insufficient for realizing the assigned task. Accordingly, I will discuss these 
two claims seriatim. 
 
 
§1 POD’s Constitutional Strategy 
 
 POD pursues widespread capital holding. It shares with WSC the view that capital 
should be private property, while it shares with Liberal Socialism the aim that economic power 
should be equalized. The notion of capital in question comprises all those economic means that 
lead to economic domination (Edmundson, 2017: 150). The type of WSC that Thomas 
portrayed is different to POD since it fails to distribute that kind of capital that produces 
economic power. Liberal Socialism excludes that kind of capital from the distribution and 
subjects it to collective ownership. POD is different to the two regimes because it aims at 
equalizing the private ownership of capital that produces economic power (cf. Edmundson, 
2017: 139). Thomas states that POD will thereby remove the conflict between capital and 
labour, i.e. the conflict between those who generate capital by owning the means of production 
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and those who generate capital by means of wage labour (Thomas, 2017: 90). As I outlined, 
widespread capital holding is brought about by mechanisms of pre-distribution and secured by 
constitutionalizing a right to widespread holding of capital (Thomas, 2017: 139, 279). While 
Thomas discusses some possible policy schemes to ensure widespread capital holding (Thomas, 
2017: xx, 170, 252, 260, 291), he states that the exact policies should be determined by the 
democratic process (Thomas, 2017: 137). Thomas is explicit about measures of universal 
healthcare and publicly funded, high-quality education. However, it is unclear whether all 
individuals are actual holders of capital, or what universal access to capital means (Thomas, 
2017: 135, 156, 162, 204, 279, 331) neither is it clear what kind of capital all have access to.10  
Thomas further states that relatively large concentrations of capital prevail in POD (Thomas, 
2017: 331). This is because POD reconciles efficiency and solidarity (Thomas, 2017: Ch. 2: 
especially: 45, 48, 245). Everything we know for sure about the institutional design of POD is 
that, first, access to education and healthcare should be ensured for all citizens equally; 
secondly, wealth, income and inheritance should be highly taxed while, third, the democratic 
process should employ a policy adjusted to the constitutional requirement of widespread capital 
holding. However, the effectiveness to ensure widespread dispersal of capital over the long run 
will depend on the exact policies that a society employs. These policies have to be determined 
in the democratic process but checked by the constitutional court. As such the constitution has 
an important role in safeguarding the stability of POD. If the constitutional regime of POD is 
not effective, the democratic process could be overruled by those who are in a materially 
superior position since inequalities in wealth remain in POD.  
Thomas has two arguments for the effectiveness of the constitution: First, since widespread 
capital holding is in the constitution the state has the role to correct unforeseeable externalities 
and provide stability. That is, the state has to make sure that widespread capital-holding is 
ensured and remains (Thomas, 2017: xx). Thus, the constitution is to guarantee the stability of 
POD and is thereby the sine qua non to ensure liberty.  
Second, Thomas claims that the institutions of POD have an educative effect on citizens 
(Thomas, 2017: 46, 143, 146, 208, 306). Since the constitution fosters and guides public 
discussion Thomas considers the constitutional right to universal capital holding to be educative 
(Thomas, 2017: 7). POD expresses reciprocity because Thomas considers the widespread 
distribution of capital to be an expression of egalitarian reciprocity. The institutions are 
expected to inform the behaviour of the citizens by guiding the law and public discourse 
(Thomas, 2017: 91, 114). Before I discuss the sufficiency of these claims I want to point out 
two assumptions about individual behaviour which Thomas considers regimes to be confronted 
with. This will be important for the subsequent discussion. 
 
 
 
                                                      
10 While it is unclear to me what “access to capital” means, it makes an actual difference whether citizens 
had universal holding of capital ensured, or simply the mere access to it because the latter seems to imply 
some sort of requirement. If widespread access would mean that all citizens would receive a credit card with 
which they could withdrawal money at the next ATM, universal holding of capital would indeed be 
coextensive with universal access. However, Thomas considers ‘widespread holding’ and ‘universal access’ 
that what all are entitled to. If just a large number of citizens are holders of the credit card in this example, 
but all have an interest in being credit card holders, we have to ask under which conditions people are entitled 
to become credit card holders and why some would not be entitled to it? 
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§2 Assumption about Human Behaviour 
 
 In the following I want to point out the hazard that regimes have to be ready to answer 
in order to avoid the accumulation of capital. While Thomas has different objections against 
WSC and Liberal Socialism they are grounded on the same assumption concerning human 
behaviour that economic institutions have to forestall in order to avoid impermissible 
inequalities. He states that in WSC oligarchic power structures are likely to emerge because the 
wealthier individuals are expected to influence the political process unduly in order to avoid 
paying the fair share that the worst-off would be entitled to (Thomas, 2017: 189). Thomas 
thereby assumes that individuals are primarily interested in advancing their vested interests 
which WSC institutions are not able to counterbalance in order to ensure a just society. The 
same interest is assumed when Thomas criticises MMS: He states that the less productive in a 
firm will exploit the more productive, which suggests that individuals are ultimately interested 
in maximizing their own profit even if it were unfair to their colleagues (Thomas, 2017: 227). 
He further states that a worker-owned firm can be expected to exploit the general taxpayer by 
refusing to repay the capital usage fee (Thomas, 2017: 230) – which can be translated as some 
kind of tax evasion. Thus, Thomas assumes that if individuals’ actions are guided by an interest 
in maximizing of their own profit they can be expected to engage in unfair actions in order to 
reach that aim. Thomas’ objection against WSC and MMS is that both systems are not able to 
counter that kind of human behaviour. (We might already object to this conclusion considering 
that I rejected the uniqueness thesis.) However, Thomas claims that POD is especially expedient 
in accomplishing this task. This becomes clear when Thomas discusses Cohen’s objection. He 
asserts that, under POD, human behaviour is directed in a way such that market-outcomes are 
fair, which would thereby avoid Cohen’s criticism (Thomas, 2017: 93).  
 Bearing in mind this assumption about human behaviour I will now discuss whether 
POD is ready to tame or redirect individual behaviour so that market outcomes are prevented 
from resulting in impermissible concentrations of wealth.  
 
 
§3 The Role of the State 
 
 Thomas claims that citizens’ behaviour can be reinterpreted, by which he means the 
following: whether or not individual actions are guided by the interest in profit maximization, 
the institutional design of POD will make sure that outcomes of market transactions are just. 
The role of the state is thereby to make sure that this eventuates, i.e. that capital is widely 
dispersed among citizens (Thomas, 2017: 89-94). In this section I want to examine what this 
entails. The unclarity about the exact strategy of the state to achieve this will provide two 
possibilities, neither of which is feasible.  
 As I mentioned throughout this paper, Thomas defends pure procedural justice. Once 
again, pure procedural justice is: the outcome is just by means of conducting the procedure, like 
for instance the outcome of a football game. That means that outcomes of market transactions 
in POD would be just whatever they might be. Further, Thomas states that relatively large-scale 
holdings of capital prevail in POD (Thomas, 2017: 331). With that said, it is questionable how 
these largescale holdings of capital should be kept within a permissible range and why they 
would not lead to economic and, further, to political domination resulting in the same drift to 
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oligarchic power that actual liberal societies experience. Thomas gives the following answer: 
he considers this scenario prevented in POD because the state has the role of ensuring 
widespread dispersion of capital.  
 Thomas states that the state has to adjust the background so that outcomes of market 
transactions are patterned fair. The state has two options to accomplish this. The first option to 
determine outcomes would be by means of taxation. If it is recognized that huge amounts of 
capital are accumulating, the state can adjust the tax scheme. However, this runs contrary to 
Thomas’ pure procedural commitment. However, Thomas ascribes the state the role to correct 
these “unintended outcomes of intended behaviour” (Thomas, 2017: 90, 162). From this it 
follows that also POD’s strategy is to correct outcomes of market transactions. If outcomes of 
market transactions have to be corrected afterwards this implies that outcomes of market 
transactions in POD are not inevitably just. According to pure procedural justice the outcome 
of a procedure is just by means of conducting the procedure. If outcomes of market transactions 
are not just in a system of pure procedural justice this means that the procedures are not just. 
This suggests either of the two conclusions: Either the procedures of POD are unjust or POD is 
not a system of pure procedural justice.  
Rawls, who differentiates between perfect, imperfect and pure procedural justice, defines the 
former two as having an independent standard – independent from the procedure – by means 
of which the outcome can be judged as just or unjust (Rawls, 1971: 74). Perfect procedural 
justice is that procedures lead inevitably to just outcomes (Rawls, 1971: 74). Imperfectly just 
procedures lead most probably, but not certainly, to just outcomes (Rawls, 1971: 74-75). Now, 
Thomas states that in order for a society to be just, capital has to be widely dispersed. 
Accordingly, Thomas considers outcomes as unjust which allow a minority of a society to 
possess considerably more material wealth then the rest of society. This is because, as was 
pointed out throughout this paper, considerable differences in wealth would lead to the 
limitation of republican liberty by means of which the first principle of justice would be 
undermined. That is why huge accumulations of capital would be considered unjust 
independent of the procedure. That means Thomas employs an independent standard of fairness 
that outcomes of procedures have to meet in order to be just. From that it follows that POD is 
not a system of pure procedural justice. Since Thomas considers unintended outcomes possible, 
he concedes that the procedures do not inevitably lead to just outcomes, i.e. widely dispersed 
capital. Thus, POD has imperfect just procedures.  
Thomas would reply that the state’s actions are adjusting the background in order for the 
principles to work purely procedurally (Thomas, 2017: 89). Rawls considers adjusted 
procedural justice an inbuilt possibility to adjust the basic structure (Rawls, 1993: 269). 
However, he considered it not a constant correction or supervision of outcomes of market 
transactions. In his discussion of Cohen’s criticism Thomas rejects the interpretation that 
Rawls’ principles would correct unjust outcomes and states that corrective justice is the wrong 
interpretation of Rawls (Thomas, 2017: 83-94). As should be clear from the discussion on WSC, 
Thomas rejects redistribution because it would make impermissible accumulations of wealth 
possible. While Thomas states that POD is not to be understood as a theory of redress, it is 
unclear how his ‘predistributionist-strategy’ is fundamentally different from redistribution 
considering that Thomas concentrates predominantly on taxation mechanisms.  
 The second option would be to adjust the notion of property. What might be 
considered adjusted procedural justice could be constituted by the demos. The demos can, by 
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means of a just procedure, adjust the institutions of the basic structure. Since the republican 
state is obliged to determine the institutions according to the interests of the citizens, the state 
would also be justified to determine the institution of property. With that said, as part of the 
institutional design of POD it would be possible that the state determines the institution of 
property. This gives raise to another problem. Thomas only considers accumulations of capital 
unjust if they cause the limitation of liberty. Accumulations of capital limit liberty only if they 
lead to political domination. Accordingly, for Thomas it is relevant that the kind of capital is 
dispersed that is responsible for political domination. Thus, the kind of capital responsible for 
political domination has to be publicly determined in order to guarantee liberty.  
The problem thus is that the difference between POD and Liberal Socialism becomes 
ambiguous (O’Neill, 2012: 76; Kerr, 2012: 456 fn. 3). Remember that the notion of property 
rights is what distinguishes POD from Liberal Socialism. POD aims at advocating private 
property, that is, the exclusive right to capital constitutive of economic power and social 
domination (Wesche, 2013: 100). It is thought not to lead to political domination because of its 
egalitarian widespread dispersion. On the other hand, Liberal Socialism does not restrict the 
private possession of capital per se, but is only concerned with restricting the possibility of a 
private exclusive right on that kind of capital relevant for economic, and thereby social, 
domination. Thus, Liberal Socialism’s notion of property is to be understood as public 
determination of property relevant for economic domination (cf. Edmundson, 2017: 139-49, 
fn.1). The notion of property is, thus, the difference between Liberal Socialism and POD. 
Accordingly in POD that kind of capital relevant for political domination is under private 
control: individuals have the exclusive right to their property. The exclusive right implies, 
however, that the institution of widespread capital holding has to be balanced against the 
institution of private property.  
 Since relatively large-scale holdings of capital prevail, it is questionable how POD 
would avoid the same deficiencies as actual economic institutions. The first option would be 
justice at the corrective level and would further not be pure procedural justice, but imperfect 
justice, if there were unintended outcomes of intended behaviour. That is, the outcome would 
be adjusted by the state. The second option is to adjust the notion of property. However this is 
the same strategy that liberal socialism pursues. The state can neither redress accumulations of 
wealth after they have happened because that would violate the exclusive right to justly 
acquired property. Neither can Thomas claim that the public would determine the notion of 
property, since that would limit the institution of private property and would be equal to the 
strategy of Liberal Socialism. What exactly Thomas means by his pre-distributive strategy thus 
remains unclear. In view of the actual situation in liberal democratic societies it can be plausibly 
assumed that those individuals possessing relatively large amounts of capital would make 
extensive use of their exclusive right to their property  which means they would try to increase 
their amount. However, Thomas rejects this, stating that the institutions of POD would have an 
educative effect on citizens behaviour. The plausibility of this argument will be considered in 
the following section. 
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§4 Educative Effect 
 
Thomas claims that POD is expressly endorsing reciprocity and can therefore be 
expected to incentivise individual behaviour accordingly (Thomas, 2017: 87). He claims that, 
in that sense, POD has an educative effect on citizens’ behaviour (Thomas, 2017: Ch. 5). In this 
subsection I consider the opposite. I want to argue that POD, while not sufficiently incentivising 
individuals’ solidarity, reinforces individual profit maximization. The idea is that the 
institutional design of POD will provide incentives for citizens to act in ways contrary to the 
aims of POD.  
 My concern is that POD adheres to conflicting values. On the one hand, it encourages 
individuals’ solidarity because the judiciary defends a right to widespread capital holding. This 
represents the commitment to the fair dues conception of reciprocity which in turn is an 
expression of solidarity. Thus, POD incentivises individuals’ solidarity. Solidarity is, according 
to Rawls, “the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of 
others who are less well off” (Rawls, 1971: 90; in Thomas, 2017: 142). While the constitution 
incentivizes to solidarity, Thomas states that POD equally fosters efficiency (Thomas, 2017: 
46). The institutions that foster efficiency are in line with actually existing market institutions, 
which are private investment, private ownership of the means of production and wage labour 
(Thomas, 2017: 37; Raekstad, 2017: 6-8). Thomas claims that POD reconciles efficiency with 
solidarity (Thomas, 2017: Ch. 2: especially: 45, 48, 245). Further, efficiency is fostered by 
means of public competition for capital producing economic power. Thomas considers not only 
that capital which is relevant for competition constituting personal well-being, but especially 
that capital that is constitutive of economic power, since he favours private ownership over the 
means of production. Thus, in POD, efficiency is fostered by competition for economic power.  
Competition is thought to foster efficiency as follows: Imagine two runners who 
compete with each other in being fastest to the finish. If only one runner ran without 
competition, he would probably just run in a comfortable pace until he reached the finish. 
Competition is thought to improve the performance of the runners. While runners try to be the 
fastest, economic actors aim at maximizing their economic power. Economic power is a scarce 
resource that is not obtained by everyone in POD, since the aim is widespread capital holding, 
which is different to universal capital holding. Just like only one of the runners can be the 
champion of the race, only some economic agents can obtain productive capital. Economic 
agents are thus competing for a scarce resource that not all will be able to obtain, and not all of 
them to the same degree. In a competition for a scarce resource it is expected that one 
outperforms another competitor. In our example of the runners, the runner who aims at winning 
expects that the other runner loses. It is, therefore, plausible to infer that competition fostered 
by institutions of POD encourages individuals to outbid others. Efficiency is thereby 
encouraging individuals to the opposite of solidarity. Again, solidarity demands that individuals 
maximize their profit only if others profit as well. On the contrary efficiency demands that 
individuals maximize their profit with the expectation that others will profit less. That means 
efficiency and solidarity demand opposing actions. Consider the following example: while 
solidarity would encourage individuals to pay taxes, efficiency would demand individuals find 
ways of avoiding them. Thus, POD is giving individuals opposing incentives. 
If Thomas assumes that POD institutions have an educative effect on individuals he has 
to acknowledge that they equally incentivize individuals to act contrary to the aim of 
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widespread capital dispersion. That is as follows: While it can be argued that the constitution 
has highest authority and has therefore a stronger educative effect, there are two concerns that 
suggest that the constitutional effect on citizens behaviour fails to materialize: First, the 
economic institutions have massive influence on citizens’ private lives since the economic 
position defines their social status. Second, Thomas assumes that individuals have a 
predisposition to maximise their individual profit. The institutions that encourage individuals 
to outbid others are thereby reinforcing that behaviour.  
Since the success of long-term widespread capital holding will depend to a large degree 
on the exact policy scheme that a society implements, it would be predicted that the interests of 
citizens in maximising their competitive positions in the market will have an effect on the 
institutions. That is for two reasons:  
First, the indetermination regarding exact policy proposals subjects the constitutionalized right 
to the criticism of being formal rather than substantive. Even if widespread access to capital is 
constitutionalized it is still debatable what counts as ‘widespread’. As I said before, how this is 
reached would be determined by the political process. However, it can be expected that this 
results not in an equalization of capital but in the opposite – the concentration of capital. The 
republican state could here not operate as a dominating agent correcting individual wealth if 
this were legitimately acquired in the first place. 
Secondly, the structural effect of economically dominant actors influences political decisions 
in their favour. That is, those possessing more productive capital would be given political 
precedence, which would likely result in the accumulation of wealth. The structural constraints 
argument states that private investment structurally undermines democratic decisions (J. Cohen, 
1989: 28). Since a society’s economic fate is dependent on the success of those who own the 
means of production, the success of parties or governments is equally dependent on a striving 
economy. That means that the success of parties and governments depends on those who own 
productive means. The structural constraints argument points out that those individuals 
possessing productive means affect political decision-making more significantly because a 
society’s economic fate depends on the individuals’ investment decisions. Joshua Cohen (1989) 
argues, that it is rational for governments to decide such that those who have the means to invest 
are most successful, since private investment decisions have long-term effects on the economy. 
Private investment is most successful if investors make more profit. That is why it is rational 
for the government to support the private appropriation of profits of those who are in possession 
of productive means (J. Cohen, 1989: 28, 44-5). Thus, parties and governments have an interest 
in supporting those who have capital that creates economic power. Thereby the government is 
supporting the profit maximization of economically dominant actors since this is in favour of 
the common interest of society.  
While the judiciary is supposed to be protecting widespread capital-holding, it is separate to the 
legislation that has an interest in the support of economic dominant actors. Since legislation and 
judiciary are separate, the constitutional court has no influence on the content of legislations 
beyond making sure that legislation accords with the constitution by blocking new legislation 
(cf. Rawls, 1993: 362). However, parties and governments depend on a flourishing economy, 
which is why they will try to make legislation that supports those who have more economic 
power. This is rational because a striving economy is better for society and therewith better for 
the success of a party or a government (J. Cohen, 1989: 28). The interests of those possessing 
the means of production can thus be expected to have more influence on political decisions. 
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Since the legislation and the judiciary have to balance the right to widespread capital against 
other institutions, like private property, it is likely that a POD state would fail to prevent 
impermissible inequalities from occurring (cf. Edmundson, 2017: 136). Thus, it is to be 
expected that POD suffers from the same ills as actual economic institutions. This is especially 
likely since Thomas endorses the same economic institutions as actually existing economies: 
competitive markets, private property, investment, and wage labour (Raekstad, 2017: 6). On 
what grounds does Thomas consider it unlikely that POD suffers from the same ills as actual 
liberal democracies? The educative effect of POD can be expected to fail to influence individual 
behaviour since its institutions incentivize individuals to the contrary. The role of the state is 
limited since it has to respect private property.  
To ensure liberty for a liberal democratic society, Thomas would be well advised to 
consider Liberal Socialist institutions. Liberal Socialism could avoid the problems that Thomas’ 
proposal is confronted with. Economic domination is structurally removed by subjecting capital 
that is producing economic domination under public determination. That is because the state 
would be the legitimate owner of capital responsible for domination and could regulate the 
distribution of wealth. On the one hand this would structurally remove the possibility of 
interpersonal domination as is Thomas aim (Thomas, 2017: 80). This would be highly attractive 
for Thomas, because he, as a republican, would welcome the state of affairs in which the public 
were in full control over possible domination and thus also of domination resulting from the 
market. On the other hand, the joint ownership of productive capital would be more an 
expression of solidarity than unequal economic power and could thus be expected to have an 
educative effect on citizens’ reciprocal behaviour.  
 
At the core of my concern was the problem of incentives. Institutions encourage 
individuals to act in certain ways. While Thomas recognizes that institutions incentivise 
individual agency he proposes no alternative institutional structure to redirect the incentives for 
individuals to act otherwise. That suggests that Thomas’ POD is open to the same problems 
that he identifies in WSC, i.e. increasing inequality. Liberal Socialist institutions remove the 
incentive for individuals to dominate each other in the market by subjecting market power to 
public control. If Thomas wants to stick with POD institutions he has to do more to prevent 
individuals from being incentivised to undermine republican liberty by accumulating 
impermissible amounts of wealth, as is his aim (Thomas, 2017: 94-6).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to consider Thomas’ proposal for alternative economic 
institutions. These institutions were thought to solve the problem of limited liberty which 
eventuates in liberal democracies due to the massive concentration of material wealth. It was 
argued that it is a threat to liberty if a wealthy minority is able to influence politics and to further 
their vested interests by means of their wealth, which is not possible in the same way for the 
majority of society.  
Thomas, who shares this view, considers POD to be the only feasible way to prevent 
the concentration of wealth and to guarantee individual liberty. While I argued that Thomas’ 
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uniqueness thesis should be rejected, I also expressed some concerns about POD’s ability to 
accomplish the given task. The problem is not only that Thomas is vague about the exact 
policies to reach the aim of widespread capital dispersion. He further accepts the basic structural 
design of current economic institutions leaving the question open how it would avoid the 
problems that liberal democracies experience at the moment.  
The emphasis on pre-distribution is valuable, especially regarding human capital. Citizens of a 
democratic state are only able to make full use of their public autonomy if they have the 
educational and physical means to contest and deliberate. That is, education and bodily health 
are crucial for the laws to track the interests of the citizens. However, regarding material capital, 
Thomas’ understanding of pre-distribution is less helpful. His claim that the task to care for 
capital dispersion is the state’s responsibility, is on the one hand self-explanatory, considering 
that Thomas endorses republicanism. On the other hand, the threat of a drift to oligarchy 
remains unresolved. Since oligarchies are characterized especially by the power resource of 
material wealth, which is able to override legal rights due to its versatility, it will depend on the 
exact policies and institutions whether the state is able to prevent the emergence of oligarchic 
power.  
I have expressed concerns that POD is not able to accomplish this task. First because largescale 
holdings of capital in private hands will prevail. This is worrying because POD is characterized 
secondly by exclusive private property rights. If individuals are in possession of a considerable 
amount of private property giving them the capacity to further their vested interests politically, 
according to the republican notion it is already a limitation on the liberty of all others – 
regardless of whether wealthy individuals use their material power or not. Thomas considers 
this prevented by the constitutionalizing of a right of widespread capital dispersion. However, 
this can be expected to fail to lead to the prevention of the problem since the institution of 
widespread capital would have to be weighed against the institution of private property. If 
individuals have already acquired a considerable amount of property that is threatening liberty, 
the state could either adjust the taxation scheme, or it could adjust the institution of property. 
While the former option is rejected by Thomas the latter option is also not feasible. It suggests 
public determination of property relevant for domination and is thereby the strategy that Liberal 
Socialism pursues. Thus, the distinguishable characteristic of POD – widespread dispersion of 
privately owned capital – becomes ambiguous. 
Further, Thomas aims at providing economic institutions that encourage a society’s 
solidarity. While the institutional design of POD incentivizes individuals to conflicting aims, it 
is however a valuable approach to solve the problem. A socioeconomic system that aims at 
realizing equal individual liberty can only be successful if it redirects individual conduct and 
not only aims to correct injustices once they have happened. Only then will it be possible for 
citizens to equally contest and deliberate. And only then will it be possible for the institutions 
to fully track citizens’ real interests and thus guarantee individual liberty. 
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